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The interests of the United States on the Korean
peninsula have escalated considerably since 1945. A
number of critical decisions by U.S. policy makers have
further increased U.S. involvement and there can be no
argument that the U.S. has been and will continue to be
involved in the affairs of this Northeast Asian country.
The dynamic diplomatic changes that have occurred in Asia
in the past decade requires that the United States re-
define their Asian interests. The U.S. has successfully
deterred the North Korean military forces for the last
thirty years but the time has come for a reassessment of
the U.S. commitments and interests in Northeast Asia, and
specifically on the Korean peninsula.
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INTRODUCTION '
The interests of the United States in Northeast Asia,
and in particular, the Korean peninsula, have undergone
tremendous changes and upheavals since the landing of the
first American ship on the Korean coast almost one hundred
years ago. This paper will attempt to analyze our past
interests in the Korean peninsula, which were mainly eco-
nomic and show the transition to the current situation.
The fluctuations will be mirrored by the changing importance
of the Korean nation(s) in United States foreign policy.
The Korean war and the events leading up to it has to
be considered a watershed in U.S. foreign policy and was
directly responsible for changing the basic relationship
between the U.S. and the Asian nations. Therefore, some of
the catalysts, namely the Truman Doctrine and Secretary
Acheson's historic speech to the National Press Club will be
examined in detail to ascertain what the American leaders
saw as the American interests and objectives in that time
period.
The major emphasis of this paper will be to analyze the
current situation, along with determining the factors which
comprise the United States' foreign policy in South Korea.
The obvious dominant factor is to prevent renewed hostili-
ties between the two Korean states. This is accomplished

by means of a combination o£ factors that our previous
American Ambassador, Richard L. Sneider, calls the
"deterrence equation". The principal factors of this
"equation" which will be examined are: The North-South
military balance, the role of the U.S. forces currently
stationed on the peninsula, the role of Japan (present and
future), the inter-play between China and the U.S.S.R.
vying for a favorable posture between the United States and
their commitments to North Korea and the role of the United
Nations peace keeping machinery. Other factors which are
important to American interests are the economic invest-
ments of U.S. companies and the development of the Korean
economy, which is a major factor in making South Korea
self-reliant. Concomitant with this is the political
development of South Korea, which at this particular time
is in chaos and will be given special consideration in this
paper
.
The' concluding analysis will try to develop a series of
policy choices for the United States in Northeast Asia. I
stress Northeast Asia because I am of the opinion that the
policies that are developed for Korea must also emphasize
Japan. The future of the two nations are closely linked




I. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN KOREA
HISTORICAL U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KOREA
*
The first contact Americans had with the Korean nation
was in 1866, when an American merchant ship, the General
Sherman
,
sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang, in
direct defiance of Korea's strict policy of isolation.
The General Sherman was attacked, burned and sunk, with the
loss of all of its crew. This was not a very auspicious
beginning and American diplomatic officials became very
concerned when the ship did not return to its planned port
of call. Our government then queried the Korean government
as to the ship's disposition v/ith no success. Later, upon
investigation, our officials were virtually certain that a
hostile Korean government had sunk her and in 1871, a
mission of retribution was planned. This consisted of five
gunships and a force of marines, under the command of
Admiral John Rodgers. This expedition eventually landed on
Kanghwa Island and met with heavy resistance. The re-
sulting conflict left 77 Koreans killed or wounded. Then,
Admiral Rodgers, who considered it foolhardy to continue
with such a demonstration, re-embarked his men and returned
home.
•^Han, Keun Woo, The History of Korea (University Press
of Hawaii, 1970) p. JET.

The next expedition, which left in 1880, had a different
mission. This was to try to negotiate a treaty with Korea,
with respect to opening Korea up for trade and the estab-
lishment of a legation at Seoul. This expedition was com-
manded by Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, who was immediately
rebuffed by the Koreans and then sought the assistance of
the Japanese. He was refused assistance by the Japanese,
because they sought to protect their own interests in the
area. Commodore Shufeldt next approached the Chinese, who
were eager to provide assistance because they thought the
presence of the United States in Korea would offset the
growing influence of the Japanese encroachment of the
Russians, With the mediation of the Chinese, a treaty was
concluded and signed in 1881, with the following provisions:
"Extra-territoriality for the United St-st^s ' citizens, the
leasing of land for a legation and residence and a most
favored nation clause," The second clause in Article I was
later to become the subject of considerable discussion
between Korea and the United States. It stated, "If other
powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government,
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed
of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus
showing their friendly feeling." Because of this clause.
7
"Donald, G. Tewksbury, Source Materials on Korean
Politics and Ideologies , Vol"! TT, (New York: Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1950)




Korea, whose foreign policy had always been conducted on
the Confucian philosophy of younger brother to elder
brother, not of equality between nations, came to regard
the United States as her "Elder Brother".
U.S. relationships with Korea then became one of
marginal interest, while the other Far East nations,
namely, China, Japan and Russia sought to obtain influence
over the Korean kingdom. The Korean peninsula was seen as
a highly desirable pawn because of her resources, ports and
geographical position in the game of Asian politics. This
led to an all out war in 1894 between Japan and China,
which Japan won decisively.
The next conflict to be fought was over the possession
of the peninsula, which again involved Japan, but this time
it was against the Russians, (1904-1905) who had become a
major power in the area, and maintained a large naval
presence in the area at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, but
the majority of Russia's military supplies came overland
via the Siberian railroad which was at this time still in-
complete. "The section around Lake Baikal, approximately
one hundred miles, consisted of a dirt trail and Russia was,
in fact, pregnant for defeat.
The Japanese had prepared long and hard for this war
with a "Western" power and consequently defeated the
Russians by destroying their "Pacific" and later on their
"Baltic" fleets. The victories on land were not so clear
11

cut and in 1905 both sides were feeling the effects of the
war, with shortages of money and manpower and the paralysis
of pure physical exhaustion.
The Japanese, who were clearly the overall victors,
,
were well aware of American sympathy for their cause and
approached President Roosevelt to request on his own
initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together
z
for the purpose of direct negotiation. Russia accepted
the offer and a treaty was concluded with the United States
offering its good offices on 5 September 1905. This treaty,
know as the "Treaty of Portsmouth", under Article I, gave
a "Russian acknowledgement that Japan possessed in Korea,
paramount political, military and economic interests, and
engaged not to obstruct such measures as Japan might seem
neccessary to take." This was under the auspices of the
United States and gave international sanction of Japan's
rights in Korea.
In addition to serving as a mediator to the Portsmouth
Treaty, the United States had, in July 1905, made a secret
pact with Japan, regarding the future disposition of the
Korean nation. This pact stated:
"...in regard to the Korean question Count Katsura
observed that Korea being the direct cause of the war
•^Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, The Far East . (New




with Russia, it is a matter of absolute importance
to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula
question should be made as a consequence of this war.
If left to herself after the war, Korea will certainly
draw back to her habit of improvidently entering into
any agreements or treaties with other powers, thus re-
suscitating the same international complications as
existed before the war. In view of the foregoing
circumstances, Japan feels absolutely constrained to
take some definite step with a view to precluding the
possibility of Korea falling back into her former
condition and of placing us again under the necessity
of entering upon another foreign war. William H. Taft,
the Secretary of War, fully admitted the justness of
the Count's observations and remarked to the effect
that, in his personal opinion, the establishment by
Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the
extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign
treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical
result of the present war and would directly contri-
bute to permanent peace in the East. "5
President Roosevelt confirmed Taf t ' s remarks to Count
Katsura and this executive agreement in effect gave the
United States sanction to the revised Anglo-Japanese
Alliance of 1905.
The United. States, by means of this agreement, had
obtained from Japan assurances that she would not turn her
aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands, and
in doing so, had subordinated Korea's national interests
to her own. But to the Koreans, this became known as the
"first" great betrayal .
Japan continued in her objective of total dominance
over Korea and on August 22, 1910, she annexed Korea and
made it a part of the Japanese Empire.
'Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War .
13

Korean nationalism was mainly of a pacifist nature
under the Japanese, but there were demonstrations which
were put down with great brutality by the Japanese. The
most important of these occurred on 1 March 1919 and is
still recognized in Korea as a national holiday. This par-
ticular demonstration was encouraged by President Wilson's
address to the Congress on January 9, 1918, where he enun-
ciated his famous "Fourteen Points". To the Korean nation-
alists the call for self-determination and the "principle
of justice to all people and nationalities, and their right
to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one
another, whether they be strong or weak" was the needed
encouragement to speak out against the Japanese, and this
they did in a Korean Declaration of Independence . This was
read to the Korean public by the thirty-three patriots who
signed the declaration. Immediately afterwards, these men
offered themselves up for arrest and this was the beginning
of the Independence Movement, which would be suppressed
over the course of the next few months with great brutality,
During this time many Korean nationals who were living
in the United States petitioned President Wilson to inter-
vene in the Korean affair. They quoted Article I of the
1882 treaty and the principles of the League of Nations.
Thomas P. Brockway, Basic Documents in U.S. Foreign
Policy (New Jersey: Anvil Original, 1957), pp. 91-93.
14

President Wilson was said to be in great anguish over the
plight of the Korean people, but could not help them
because of the international agreements that had been con-
cluded in good faith with Japan. This is considered by
modern day Koreans as the second great betrayal.
The Japanese occupation of Korea ended on 15 August
1945, with the end of World War II. Prior to Japan's
surrender, on December 1, 1943, the United States, United
Kingdom and China had declared at the Cairo Conference that
"the aforesaid great powers, mindful of the enslavement of
the people of Korea, are determined that in due course
7Korea shall become free and independent." * On July 26,
1945, the United States, United Kingdom, and China re-
affirmed their Cairo position on Korea in the Potsdam
Declaration; and, on August 8, 1945, upon its entry into
the war against Japan, the Soviet Union declared its ad-
herence to the Potsdam Declaration, and thus joined the
three other participating nations in their commitment to
make Korea free and independent^
Soviet troops entered Korean territory on August 9,
1945, and by August 15 had overrun all of Korea north of
the thirty-eighth parallel. This division of territorial
control was a military decision, which was later confirmed
it
(See full text of this agreement at Appendix #1)
7
Leland M. Goodrich, Korea (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1956), Appendix p. 214.
15

in General MacArthur's General Order #1 of September 2,
1945, for the surrender of Japan, and was accepted by all
the nations bound by the Potsdam Declaration. The occupa-
tion of Korea by the Soviets and later the United States is
felt to be the third betrayal of the Korean people by the
U.S. Immediately following the surrender of Japan there was
in Korea a mood of jubilation and excitement, after forty
years of struggle against the oppression of foreign rulers
who tried to obliterate her identity and Korea was free.
This feeling of exhilaration was soon to be overshadowed by
internal political differences and the head-on collision
between the United States and the hegemony of the Soviets.
During the period between Japan's surrender on August
14, 1945 and the beginning of American occupation on
September 8, the Koreans had set up a loose provisional
government which was under the leadership of leftist and
anti -Japanese elements. Meanwhile, the nationalist backed
exile leaders, like Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku began to arrive,
but "they had to declare that they had returned in the
capacity of private citizens", for the American government
under Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, who was also the
Commanding General of the American forces in Korea, had
made it clear in a statement published on October 25, that
the "Military Government is the only government in Southern




9Korea." This position, together with the initial stop-
gap retention of Japanese administrative personnel in many
positions, created friction between the military government
and the Koreans, who had expected to regain independence
immediately.
The American military government also made it clear
that all freedom of political activity was guaranteed and
that they would observe strict neutrality in all arrange-
ments made by the various (sixty political parties existed
at this time) Koreans in the process of organizing a
government and holding elections.
In the north, meanwhile, the Soviet occupation forces
used a subtler line in their control of Korean territory.
They hastened to set up a communist government styled after
the Russian regime and led by Korean sympathizers. Cho
Man Sik at first headed the Council of People's commissars,
but was soon replaced by Kim Il-song. The Russians used
these sympathizers to put through their own measures, with
themselves staying in the background, thus giving the
facade of Korean self-government.
This arrangement of the Soviets north of the thirty-
eighth and of the United States south was supposed to have
been a purely temporary arrangement, until such time as a
^Ibid, p. 49.







Korean government could be formed and national elections
held under the supervison of the United Nations, However,
it soon became clear that the Russians had different plans.
There were attempts to establish working arrangements with
the Soviet administration in Northern Korea, but these
attempts were all unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Government was making plans for
Korea and on October 20, the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee made a policy decision that "the present zonal
military occupation of Korea by the United States and
Soviet forces should be superseded at the earliest possible
12date by a trusteeship for Korea." This was shocking news
to the Korean people and the continued division was widely
resented by the populace and demonstrations were practically
continuous until the end of 1945.
On December 27, 1945, the Council of Foreign Ministers
of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union
concluded the Moscow Agreement.* As planned, the United
States called for a trusteeship for Korea, whose mission
would be to work toward a more unified administration of the
country, and to implement the terms of the agreement itself.
By the terms of the agreement, the trusteeship was to last
for a period of five years.
•"^Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University
of Penn. Press, 1957), pp. 55-56.
^^Goodrich, Korea
, pp. 60-61.
*(See Appendix #2 for an Extract of this agreement.)
18

The Joint Commission as called for in the Moscow Agree-
ment began to meet on 20 March 1946, and almost immediately
was at odds with the Soviets. The Commission itself proved
to be unworkable and the United States on September 17,
1947, in an address before the United Nations General
Assembly called that body's attention to the unresolved
problems in Korea. The United Nations agreed that the
Korean question was at an impasse and despite Russian ob-
jections, would attempt a solution.
The United Nations created a Temporary Commission on
Korea (UNTCOK) who had the authority to travel, observe and
consult in all parts of Korea, and to hold elections that
would be observed by the UNTCOK team. Part of their mission
was to set up an elected National Assembly according to the
proportions of the population from the two zones, whose
members would then be authorized to establish a national
government. After a national government had been estab-
lished, that government should, in consultation with UNTCOK,
set up its own national security force. The national
government would then take over governmental functions from
the occupation armies and arrange for withdrawal of their
14
troops, within ninety days if possible.
The UNTCOK arrived in Korea on January 8, 1948 and
tried to implement the U.N. resolution, but there was a
'•U.S. Department of State, Korea - 1945 to 1948




lack o£ Soviet response and Radio Pyongyang proceeded to
denounce the Commission.
UNTCOK then requested guidance from the U.N. Interim
Committee who resolved, on February 26, 1948, that:
"in its view it is incumbent upon the United Nations
Temporary Commission on Korea, under the terms of the
General Assembly resolution of 14 November 1947, and in
the light of developments in the situation with Korea,
since that date, to implement the programme as out-
lined in resolution II in such parts of Korea as are
accessible to the commission. "15
Under this resolution UNTCOK proceeded with elections
in South Korea. The election was held and observed by
UNTCOK (limited by number of official observers) and the
result was a victory for the elements under Syngman Rhee.
This elected National Assembly quickly went ahead and
promulgated a constitution and elected Mr. Rhee as
1 f\
President of the Republic of Korea on July 20.
The United States recognized this new Korean govern-
ment along with Nationalist China on August 12. The
Republic of Korea was officially inaugurated on August 15,
1948, and the United States prepared to gradually withdraw




Goodrich, Korea, p, 59.
20

II. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
KOREA: 1947-1950
American interests in Korea at this time were to lay
the foundations of a democratic government and then give
the Korean people the opportunity to choose for themselves
the style of government under which they wanted to live.
The American government did this under the auspices of the
United Nations, but were not successful in reuniting the
whole peninsula because of the Russian-backed takeover of
the North by the Communists.
The Korean people were caught between two superpowers
with conflicting ideologies, namely, democracy and commu-
nism, but the Russians were better organized and had
absolute goals in mind. Whereas, the Americans wer^e more
desirous of peace and did not perceive any "vital" interests
at stake in Korea. Korea was more or less a "sideshow" to
Europe and Japan.
After the end of World War II, the United States was
recognizing that the Russians were trying to exploit the
weakened condition of the defeated countries. Soviet power
was firmly entrenched in Eastern Europe and now the
Communists were trying to make inroads into Greece and
Turkey. It was under these conditions that President




"One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy
of the United States is the creation of conditions in
which we and other nations will be able to work out a
way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamen-
tal issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our
victory was won over countries which sought to impose
their will, and their way of life, upon other nations...
We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless
we are willing to help free people to maintain their
free institutions and their national integrity against
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine
the foundations of international peace and hence the
security of the United States. "18*
It was as a result of this doctrine coupled with the
Marshall Plan and an article by Mr. X (George Kennan) that
America's leaders and the attentive public made the tran-
sition from collaboration with the Soviets to containment,
19
as the underlying principle in U.S. -Soviet relations.
The South Korean people put great faith in President
Truman's statements and were acutely disappointed when the
United Nations was unable to unify Korea. Nevertheless,
core policy of the United Nations and the United States
still envisioned a unified, stable and independent Korea
is
(Complete text at Appendix #3)
^^John D. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., Eds.,
American Defense Policy , (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1977) pp. 60-61.
'^Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision , (New York: The
Free Press, 1968) p. 6^
22

with a representative government, and a growing economy that
would be oriented toward the Free World.
Despite declarations of support for the Republic of
Korea, statements and actions of our leaders and Congress
in early 1950 gave the impression to the international
community that we were not altogether behind the government
of South Korea. The major facts that illustrate this
weakening American support are U.S. troop withdrawal and
Secretary Acheson's (infamous) speech made before the
National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on January 12, 1950
In this speech Secretary Acheson commented on military
security in the Pacific and establishing a defense peri-
meter which "runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then
21goes to the Ryukyus." This completely excluded Korea
from the defensive perimeter of the United States. In
addition, when he mentioned Korea, he reinforced the notion
that Korea was outside this perimeter of military action
by noting that we had ended our military occupation of that
country.
Extracts from that speech illustrate how the world
community could have perceived our military intentions
20
Andrew C. Nahm, Korea and the New Order in East Asia ,
(Western Michigan University, 1975) p. 95
.
(Extract of text at Appendix #4.)
^^Department of State Bulletin, Crisis in Asia , (Office
of Public Affairs, January 23, 1950) p. 116.
23

negatively. Secretary Acheson went on to explain:
So far as the military security of other areas of
the Pacific is concerned it must be clear that no
person can guarantee these areas against military
attack. But it must also be made clear that such
a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within
the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to
say where such an attack would come from - the ini-
tial reliance must be on the people attacked to
resist it and then upon the commitments of the en-
tire civilized world under the Charter of the United
Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to
lean on by any people who are determined to protect
their independence against outside aggression. But
it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and
Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military
considerations. Important as these are, there are
other problems that press, and these other problems
are not capable of solution through military means.
These other problems arise out of susceptibility of
many areas, and many countries of the Pacific area,
to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stop-
ped by military means. 22
The perception of the international community had to
note this military deemphasis by no means indicated a
denial of continuing general interest. In the same speech.
Secretary Acheson later emphasized:
We have given that nation (Korea) great help in get-
ting itself established. We are asking Congress to
continue this help until it is firmly established, and
tha.t legislation is now pending before Congress. The
idea that we should scrap all of that, that we should
stop halfway through the achievement of the establish-
ment of this country, seems to me to be the most utter





The legislation that was pending before the Congress
was a $60 million supplemental Korean aid bill that was
before the House. A week later, on 19 January, 1950, the
House of Representatives defeated the measure by a vote of
24192 to 191, This major setback to an aggressive American
foreign policy in regards to the Korean peninsula, was a
major factor in creating the perception that the United
States, at that time completely concerned by the rise of
Mao Tse-tung in China, would not come to the military
defense of the ROK in case of a "hot" war.
In the meantime, in defiance of the United Nations
resolution, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was
formed in September 1948. The Soviets almost immediately
began to arm this new Republic and on 25 June, 1950, the
DPRK attacked, without warning or declaration of war, the
Republic of Korea.
It must be noted that there still remains much contro-
versy as to "how" the war started. I.F. Stone in his book,
The Hidden History of the Korean War , is at variance with
the official UNCOK-US version on almost every point. Mr.
Stone suggests that because of the weakening stance of
America's foreign policy in Korea, Syngman Rhee deliberate-
ly provoked the North by attacking first.
24
Paige, Korean Decision , p. 66.
25

Rhee was hoping that the North would retaliate in force,
requiring the United States to involve itself, because
failure to do so would have markedly weakened the prestige
and position of the United States in the Cold War. After
all, the Republic of Korea had been a product of US-USSR-UN
policy. Not to have defended Korea in the opinion of
President Truman, would have been considered appeasement of
Communists, especially among the nations opposed to communist
expansion. Mr. Stone's analysis holds little credibility for
anyone associated with military planning. The sheer logis-
tics of planning a successful military operation, on any
scale, much less a major invasion, requires extensive
planning and preparation to be successful. It is obvious by
the sequence of events following June 25th, that the North
Koreans had accomplished the required planning and that the
fuel, ammunition, rations and vehicles to sustain such an
attack were in place and in a high state of readiness.
I will conclude the historical summary of U.S. involve-
ment in Korea with a brief analysis of the American deci-
sion to intervene in Korea. To do this we must try to make
an assessment of the motives behind the North Korean attack.
Generally, these five following interpretations are put
forward:
1. The "Diversionary Move" Interpretation. American
policy-makers were concerned at this time about the possi-
bility of a series of Communist actions throughout the world,
26

but not an attack on South Korea. Therefore, it was sus-
pected that the attack on the R.O.K. was merely a "diversion*
or side issue in Russia's (not Chua's) expansion.
2. The "Soft-Spot Probing' Interpretation. It was the
State Department's consensus that the North Korean attack
was in actuality a "feeling out" and the U.S. position,
which, if indicators were correct, acted on the assumption
that South Korea was not a strategic place to stand up
against the Soviets.
3. The "Testing" Interpretation. The implication here,
was that if the ant i -communist forces failed to resist the
North Korean attack, then further Communist aggression would
occur throughout the world.
4. The "Demonstration" Interpretation. This interpre-
tation, the Soviets' intentions were to demonstrate their
own strength and show the weakness of allies.
5. "Soviet Far East Strategy" Interpretation. This
interpretation follows the thesis of John Foster Dulles,
who believed that the North Korean attack was partially
motivated by the desire to block American efforts to make
Japan a member of the Western camp and to pave the way for
?5
further Communist expansion in the Far East."
2 S
Alexander L. George, "American Foreign Policymaking
and the North Korean Aggression," World Politics Vol. VII,
No, 2 (January, 1955), pp. 211-215.
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The various interpretations noted above not only attri-
butes different intentions to the Soviet move in North
Korea, but contains several various implications for
American foreign policy in reacting to the Communist
aggression.
What is disturbing is that in researching and analyzing
the various factors which attributed to the war, there was
at that time a distinct lack of attention given to the
Chinese role in Asia. Here was a country with a huge
resource of people and vast numbers of newly acquired
military equipment, who was also Communist, and had a large
contiguous border with North Korea. Surely, Kim Il-sung
and Chairman Mao had discussed and planned a Korean "libera'
tion" in conjunction with the Soviet planners. The Chinese
seem to have become critically involved as danger grew to
the majority of their natural resources and their indus-
trial complexes are located in Manchuria, directly above
North Korea. The American planners were obviously more
concerned with the hegemony of the Soviet Union, than in
the vital interests of China.
The Korean War represented a climactic confrontation
between the Communists and the Free World. The communist
countries had seen that the United States would react
swiftly and decisively to outright communist aggression.
The United States also learned that its objectives and
policies could not be obtained without an adequate
28

defensive structure. Therefore, after the fighting, a U.S-
R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty was promulgated and signed in
Washington, D.C. on October 1, 1953, The treaty promised
U.S. action in "the event of an armed attack against the
territory which has been recognized by the United States as
lawfully brought under the administrative control of the
R.O.K., and that each party will act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."
It is under the auspices of this document that a sub-
stantial number of U.S. soldiers, 39,000 in 1980, have been
stationed on the peninsula at our discretion for close to
thirty years. The debacle of the war in Vietnam has made
the U.S. take a new look at its Asian commitments and
interests. This process of self-examination has not pro-
duced a new policy for Asia, but it has produced pressures
for withdrawing American ground forces from South Korea.
The major rationale for the positioning of these American
forces has been the maintenance of a North/South strategic
balance and the deterrence of future hostilities.
The United States has several areas of interests in
Korea, but the major ones have to be security, economic and
political. Each of these subjects requires a major analysis
to understand U.S. policies and objectives in Korea.
7 f\
Hearings Before the U.S. Senate on Foreign Relations
on the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea. (Government
Printing Office, 1954), p. 12.
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Therefore, this paper will approach each area as a sepa
rate entity for analysis.
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III. U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN KOREA
The prospects for security and stability on the Korean
peninsula requires at a minimum, deterrence of the North
Korean forces. This is a most formidable task because
North Korea has the fifth largest standing army in the
27
world. The crucial question then becomes, how large of
a force is necessary and how much risk does this impose
upon the United States? These are not easy questions to
answer and the answers would have to contain several compo-
nents; such as, a comparison of the order of battle of
North and South Korea; the role and strength of the U.S.
forces; the influence and possible support North Korea has
from the Soviet Union and China; the role of Japan and the
continuing participation of the United Nations.
The perception of North Korea in regards to our capa-
bilities and our will to fight becomes a major considera-
tion in the deterrence equation. Has the Nixon Doctrine,
the communist victory in Vietnam, our abrogation of the
Republic of China Treaty, our well publicized withdrawal
plans and the political upheavals in South Korea weighted
the equation in North Korea's favor? This is an unanswer-
able question, but one that needs consideration. The
2 7




equation has taken many shifts since the stalemate that
ended the war in 1953. North Korea has steadily outspent
the South, especially during the /ears of 1967 through 1971,
when North Korea spent almost one-third of its national
budget on military expenditures as compared to 16.5% for the
South. However, the South hit a crossover point in 1975
,
because of its expanding industrial base and GNP and has
since been able to outspend the North. '
Deterrence may be achieved on the peninsula at low
levels of U.S. military strength if the North considers that
the end result of involving the United States makes the
costs of aggression too great. This seems to be the status
quo situation, which has been achieved since 1953, despite
the fluctuations in the equation. The continuing build-up
of South Korea's defensive capabilities and the concomitant
reduction of U.S. forces, such as the withdrawal of the 7th
Division in 1971, seems to indicate a further reduction of
U.S. presence in the near future.
President Carter, in his election campaign in 1975, had
promised a withdrawal of combat forces from South Korea and
subsequently in 1978, began to v\rithdraw units from the 2nd
Infantry Division, stationed north of Seoul. At this time,
military planners felt that "the growing South Korean




























68 70 72 7^ 76 78
-r
80
Source: Richard P. Cassidy, "Arms Transfers and Security
Assistance to the Korean Peninsula, 1945-1980." (Master's
Thesis, flaval Postgraduate School, 1980), p. 305.
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begin withdrawing its ground forces from Korea in 1978 and
2 R
to complete this withdrawal by 1980." However, in early
1979, the intelligence community began to revise sharply
upward the North Korean number of mefn under arms and num-
bers of major weapon systems. The number of North Korean
divisions jumped from 25 to 41 (including separate
brigades) and their tank assets from 2,000 to 2,600+.
"How much of this re-assessment was due to new informa-
tion, to a review of old data or to increased intelli-
gence effort was not clear; certainly some of the
figures that were being quoted had been on offer in
the intelligence community for some time, notably from
sources in Seoul, but had previously been discounted.
Suspicion was rife that this was an attempt by the
Pentagon to influence the debate about the wisdom of
the withdrawal plan, or even that they were being pro-
vided to make it easier for the President to go back
on his plan or to modify it if he wanted to."
The skepticism is now a moot point, because the new
figures have been substantiated by increased intelligence
efforts (U-2 overflights) and the withdrawal was halted by
the President.
2 8
The Defense Monitor , Center for Defense Information,
Washington, D.C., Vol. 5, #1, January, 1976.
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IV. THE NORTH -SOUTH MILITARY BALANCE
The military strength of North Korea has been the
dominant feature in the military equation for the last
three decades. The huge amounts of men and material the
North puts into the war preparation effort is not reflec-
tive of a defensive posture, but is of a strong offensive
configuration. The production of significantly higher
numbers of modern river crossing equipment and the ordering
of 8,000 scuba outfits from Japan during the 1970s also
indicates an offensive threat. Only in the attack would
such equipment be required for hasty river crossings of the
Imj in River and the Han estuary.
Both countries indigenously produce significant amounts
of military hardware. South Korea's defense industries
produce howitzers, rifles, small caliber ammunition, small
displacement ships, mortars, rocket launchers, Vulcan air
defense systems and a limited range surface missile, which
was recently tested. Nearly fifty percent of all of South
Korea's military equipment is of U.S. manufacture, which
keeps South Korea dependent on the U.S. for spare parts
29
and equipment.
^^ SIPRI yearbooks 1977, 1978, 1979 , "Foreign Military




1979) , South Korea Summary, p. T7~.
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Currently, the North has a clear-cut advantage in the
scale of its defense industry. Except for the most sophis-
ticated items, such as aircraft, electronic equipment and
missiles, the North has the capacity to equip its naval and
ground forces with large numbers of tanks, APCs, mobile
artillery and small arms. The North has also put under-
ground almost all of its industrial, naval and especially
its air facilities. This has created another vast swing
in the overall equation. As Major General George J.
Keegan, Jr., USAF (Ret.) states in a letter to the editor
of Aviation Week and Space Technology (October 31, 1977)
that:
"...North Korea - like the Soviet Union - has built
one of the most extensive underground military and
civil defense capabilities anywhere in the world.
Having been ravaged by retaliatory air attacks of
the Korean War, North Korea has taken extraordinary
pains to harden and protect every target in the
country. Submarines and ships are now protected in
vast underground shelters. Tactical aircraft are
now protected by tough shelters, and virtually
indestructable hangars built into nearly mountain-
sides at virtually all of North Korea's important
air bases. In fact, such shelters now protect
virtually all of the important air, ground and
naval combat units of the North Korean armed forces,
in addition to all important commands, communication,
supply, weapons, and production centers .. .North
Korean military target systems today are beyond the
capabilities of U.S. conventional or nuclear weapons
to destroy or damage severely. It will matter little
that U.S. air and naval units are in the Western
Pacific to reinforce South Korea. The fact of the
Richard H. Solomon, Ed. , Asian Security in the 1980s
Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition . (Rand




matter is that even with the most modern weapons, such
forces are powerless to redress the severe imbalance
posed by the North Korean military and civil defense
hardening measures. The North Korean forces today
are virtually immune to the best U.S. weapons systems,
be they air, ground or naval. These are hardly
stabilizing elements."
Major General Keegan's comments are quite enlightening,
but even if these military targets are virtually indestruc-
table, there still have to be airstrips, access roads and
bridges which would be within our capability to destroy.
But the deterrence equation does become heavily weighted in
North Korea's favor if in fact, she is an underground
nation.
The North's continuing emphasis on military production
and procurement has also sustained the commanding lead that
the DPRK built up in the 1960s in sheer numbers of military




MILITARY FORCE BALANCE COMPARISON^"^
1970 1977
Republic North Republic North
of Korea Korea of Korea Korea
Personnel
Active forces 634,000 400,000 600,000 520,000
Reserve forces 1,000,000 1 ,200,000 3,000,000 2,000,000
Maneuver divisions 19 20 19 25
Ground balance
Tanks 900 600 1,100^ 2,000^
APC 300 120 400^ 750^
Assault guns 300 105^






Navy Combat vessels 60 190 90-100
4,335'
missiles (battalions)^ M NA 1 2-3
Mortars NA NA NA 9,000
Air balance
Jet combat aircraft 230 555 320^ 600
Other military aircraft 35a 130 200 400
AAA guns 850 2,000 2,000^ 5,500'
SAMs (battalions/sites) NA NA 2 40-45
450-475
Source: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop
IVithdrawal from the Republic of Korea, January 9, 1978, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.
ihese are approximations; actual figures may be greater.
^NlA = not available.
Source: Senate Committe on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Troop With-
drawal from the Republic of Korea, January 9, 1978," U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.
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The North in 1970 had established itself as being
numerically superior in all categories of military equip-
ment. The only category where there was a shortfall was in
the number of active forces and reserve forces. The DPRK
had made substantial inroads in this area by 1977, even
with the distinct disadvantages of having less than one
half of South Korea's population, (17,580,00 versus
37,760,000). The latest intelligence figures are illustra-




Comparison of Ground, Air and Naval Forces, 1979
Component Ground Forces North Republic
Korea of Korea
Active Duty personnel 700,000* 520,000
Combat Divisions 35 17
Motorized Inf. Divs. 3
Armor 2 1
Separate Infantry Brigades 4 2
Separate Armor Regiments 5 2
Light Infantry Brigades 6-8
Paramilitary/militia 2,500,000 2,800,000




Field Artillery pieces 3,500 2,104
Miltiple Rocket Launchers 1,300
Nbrtars 9,000 5,300
Infantry Ant i -Tank weapons 24,000 11,000
AAA weapons 5,500 700
Sm sites 38-40 80
figures reflect 1970 data obtained from various unclassified
sources
.
•^^Sources: The Military Balance 1979-1980 , International Institute












Total combat ships 425-456 104
Patrol frigates
Missile AKK boats 18 (Styx:) 8 (harpoon)
Coastal patrol 300 23




Combat aircraft 565 254
Bombers IL-•28 85
Fighters SU-7 20 18 F-4D






AN-2 200 12 C-46
AN-24 40 10 C-54
IL-14/18 10 10 C-123
TU-154 1 2 H5-748
Helicopters 60 54
Missiles AA--2 Atoll .^AM Sidewinder,





On order: Rumor has
it that DPRK will re-
ceive 18 Mig-23s in
1980.
On Order: 18 F-4E,
14 F-5E, 24 OV-lOG,
6 C130-H tpts, 6
C4-47C, 50 Hughes






Intelligence sources and press reports indicate that
some of the above figures might be low and they assess the
North with more armor - 2600 tanks and well over 1000 APCs,
and more multiple rocket launchers. In addition, the DPRK
has lowered the draft age to 16 and is accredited with a
substantially larger number of reserves.
Taken as a whole picture, North Korea is probably the
most mobilized nation in the \vorld. Her forces are con-
figured largely for offensive operations, and her homeland
is essentially safe and secure. Besides the obvious advan-
tages of quantity, the North has several other military
advantages over the South. The North has the advantage of
surprise and will be able to concentrate her attacking
forces. The North also has to penetrate only thirty miles
to capture the political and industrial center of South
Korea, and since her allies are both located on contiguous
borders the logistic problem becomes in a protracted war,
less severe.
The South is very cognizant of these advantages and has
taken steps to nullify them. First of all, since there are
only limited corridors of attack, the South has turned the
areas north of Seoul into a "mini" Maginot line, with
several hundred kilometers of highly sophisticated "defense
Sam Jameson, "U.S. Believes N. Korean Troops Out
number the South' s," Los Angeles Times , July 16, 1979,
Sec 1-A, p. 1-2.
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wall" and associated fortifications. The defense wall's
main purpose is to block the North Korean tanks from the
major avenues of approach, so that they can be held in
place and systematically destroyed. The South has tailored
her armed forces into mainly a defensive posture and there
is a Clausewitzean doctrine that advocates a ratio of 2 to
34
1 in an attack. If the South' s fortifications are added
into this doctirne the North Koreans would need a 3 to 1
ratio to be successful, but there is an old military saying
that any position can be taken if the attacker is willing
to pay the price.
The South has a qualitatively superior air force and a
large portion of her armed forces has accumulated extensive
combat experience in Vietnam, However, the major factor
that contributes to balancing the equation is the continued
presence of U.S. forces.
U.S. Force Levels
Currently, there are approximately 39,000 American
troops stationed in Korea. The major unit is the 2nd
Infantry Division which is positioned north of Seoul on one
of the major invasion corridors. It is currently short one
battalion, which was withdrawn in 1978, but as late as 1979
it was still at division strength due to KATUSA (Korean
"^"^William J. Barnds , Ed., The Two Koreas in East Asian
Affairs (New York: New York University Press, 1976}, p. 145
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Augmentation to the U.S. Army) augmentation. Other units
which make up the balance of U.S. forces in Korea are the
314th Air Division, Army missile and defense commands and
logistic, intelligence, communications and combat support
units. In wartime, all of these units would be under the
command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) , which is an
all service and integrated headquarters. Upon mobilization,
CFC would also draw upon forces from the 3.5 million ROK
reserve. The missions of CFC are:
'1. To provide credible deterrence to prevent armed
aggression or adventurism from outside of the Republic;
2. should deterrence fail, to defeat the aggressor
force."
The deterrence mission of the United States is per-
formed by stationing the U.S. combat forces in a "forward"
position, where they perform the function of a "tripwire."
The value of this U.S. division is not in its fighting
capabilities, but that it serves as a warning to the North
Koreans that any attack would invariably involve American
troops. It also signifies to the North and South that
Americans are willing to live up to their treaty commitment
to take action against an external aggressor in accordance
with their constitutional processes.
^General John A. Wickham, Jr., CINC, UNC, Korea, "The




Any total or precipitate withdrawal of U.S. forces from
the peninsula, particularly the 2nd Infantry Division, would
probably give the wrong signal to the North, as it did in
1950. To preclude this from happening again, the United
States has followed a policy of a phased and selective re-
deployment to make it explicitly clear to the North and
South Koreans that such limited measures as these are by
no means tantamount to abandonment or are even a re-
assessment of our national interest on the Korean peninsula.
The United States must continue to be especially careful
not to give the North Koreans cause or excuse for miscalcu-
lation of America's intent.
The fundamental question for the U.S. is what commit-
ment of American forces to the Korean peninsula is the most
effective for the protection of U.S. national interests as
they are challenged all over the world? What level of
troops are best and how long should they remain?
The U.S. leadership recognizes the need for maintaining
a strong military presence on the Korean peninsula as
recently noted by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his
recent POD Annual Report for FY 1981
,
in which he says:
"Faced with these dangers, we have honored our pledge
of 1977 to maintain our military strength in Asia.
We have, in fact, somewhat increased our forces above
the level we had previously planned. By the end of
1978, we had withdrawn one battalion from the 2nd
Infantry Division in Korea, but any further withdrawal
of combat elements from the division will be held in
abeyance until 1981. At that time we will consider
whether a satisfactory North-South balance has been
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restored, and whether there has been tangible progress
toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula...
I have also emphasized that the United States must re-
tain the flexibility to move its forces- -principally
naval and air units--where needed, and that this flexi-
bility to 'swing' forces in no way discriminates against
Asia."
Secretary Brown makes it clear to the Asian community
that U.S. needs and interests come first, but that we can
be counted upon to honor our treaty commitments and will
continue to give the stability of Northeast Asia high
priority.
Role of Japan
Japan is in the unique position of being considered a
major power, but with a distinct lack of military power to
back up her international position. The Korean situation
then becomes of paramount importance to the Japanese, whose
main interest is to reduce North-South tensions and to
prevent another Korean War. Japan's broader interest in
the area is one of avoidance and preservation of the status
quo. Japan cannot afford to antagonize any of the super-
powers in the area and especially avoids conflicts with
China and Russia.
History has an important part to play in Japan's re-
lationships with the two Koreas, because of her long and
sometimes brutally enforced colonization of the Korean
peninsula from 1910 through 1945. There still remains
much bitterness among the older Koreans, who were forced to
45

have Japanese names and were not allowed to use the Korean
language. Even now, there exists a strong love-hate
relationship between Japan and Korea. In fact, a normali-
zation treaty was not signed between the two countries
until 1965 and even then there was much dissent from the
Korean public.
The Japanese view toward the Korean peninsula is one
of permanent anxiety. For the moment, they lean strongly
toward the South, primarily because of the large economic
investment which is subsidized by the continued presence of
U.S. forces. The major Japanese concern is that the un-
stable situation in the South could cause the United States
or North Korea to react in an impulsive manner and embroil
Japan in a physical or political conflict with China or the
Soviet Union.
The impending withdrawal of American forces from the
peninsula requires the Japanese government to reassess their
security measures, which are meagre if compared with the
other nations in Northeast Asia. If the Japanese feel that
the continued presence of U.S. forces is necessary, they are
reluctant to say so because Washington would then pressure
the Japanese to share the "burden" for Korea's defense.
Therefore, Japan will continue to support the status quo
Franklin B. V/einstein, Ed., U.S. -Japan Relations and






and will seek to preserve the only item they consider
"essential" to their security. That is the treaty with the
37United States.
Chinese Perceptions and Interests
China's role in Korea stems from her active support of
the DPRK, when the North Korean army was almost destroyed
in late 1950. Chinese involvement in the Korean War has
long been a subject for conjecture and many historians cite
the war as being the major catalyst of the Sino-Soviet
split. The most important and enlightening study has been
Robert Simmons' The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang
,
38Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War . In this
book Simmons states that:
"The usual interpretation of China's entrance into the
Korean Civil War has been that it was done cautiously,
in an effort to protect the Manchurian frontier. While
this is obviously correct, it is also an insufficient
explanation of the circumstances and the causes of
China's crossing the Yalu. These can only be fully
found in the interrelationship between the three commu-
nist allies. It was the Soviet Union's reticence which
finally prompted China's intervention. [China] entered
the war not only when it seemed that the United States
was actually threatening her territory, but also, and
equally important, when it became obvious that Russia
would steadfastly refuse to use her troops on the penin-
sula to protect China from an American incursion which
was using the Korean peninsula as an invasion corridor.
China's hopes for a successful military alliance with










Whatever China's reasons for entering the war, she
paid a high price for her involvement. She lost the oppor-
tunity to "liberate" Taiwan and was labeled an "aggressor"
and consequently was denied diplomatic recognition by a
large segment of the international community.
Today, China gives great importance to her relationship
with Pyongyang. The reasons for this are varied, but
primarily stem from China, by virtue of being the weak
sister in the Sino-Soviet dispute, must keep Korea on her
side, because without the DPRK, China would stand alone in
Asia confronting the Soviet Union. Moreover, a pro-Soviet
Pyongyang would pose an enormous security threat to China's
military-industrial centers in Manchuria.
Yet, despite North Korea's strategic importance to China,
Peking lacks the sophisticated military equipment and the
economic wherewithall to meet Pyongyang's extensive needs.
China has been stepping up her efforts to provide Pyongyang
with economic support, mainly with cheap oil. But she
cannot provide the modern weaponry that North Korea will
increasingly need as the South builds up its military
capabilities, especially in the coming years, when Pyongyang's
40
military superiority may vanish. The result of North
Korea being a more "vital interest to Peking than Moscow,
^^Hong Yung Lee, "Korea's Future: Peking's Perspective,"
Asian Survey
,
Vol. XV No. 12, December 1975, pp. 1091-1092.
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China must placate the North Koreans with rhetoric and must
appear to support Kim U-sung's plan for "Peaceful Reunifica-
tion of Korea."
China obviously has the advantages of culture and racial
closeness with the North Koreans over the Russians, but her
rapprochement with the United States and Japan has caused
some concern among the North Korean leadership. Peking has
tried to reassure Pyongyang with increased military and
economic aid, but to what extent Pyongyang has been placated
41
IS uncertain.
Currently, Pyongyang seems to tilt toward China's side
of the spectrum, but this is probably a transitory state and
Kim Il-sung will keep playing off Peking against Moscow.
Kim Il-sung's major concern is to keep North Korea self-
reliant and independent as possible and to prevent domination
by either of the two communist giants.
The Chinese government officially denounces the presence
of U.S. troops on the peninsula, but unofficially opposes
our withdrawal from the area. The reasons for this are two-
fold: first of all our withdrawal would not be conducive
to continued stability in the area which the Chinese are also
interested in preserving, and secondly, it might present the
Soviets with an opportunity to increase their influence vis
Ralph N. Clough, Deterrence and Defense in Korea
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 41
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a vis China, by creating conditions where the North might
perceive a need for more advanced weapon systems, as a
result of our extensive refurbishing of the Korean army. If
this were the case the Soviets would require concessions from
the North, such as they recently received in their MIG-23
transaction, where they reportedly obtained use of the facili-
ties at Naj in Harbor, which is located close to the Soviet
port of Vladivostok. Therefore, talk of a U.S. withdrawal
from the Korean peninsula "upsets" the Chinese, who are in
favor of maintaining a "Status Quo" situation.
Soviet Interests in North Korea
North Korea is one of the few countries of the world
which has been able to assert their own independence after
having been firmly entrenched as a Soviet "satellite."
It is known that Kim Il-sung was Josef Stalin's personal
choice for the leadership position in North Korea, because
"he was a limited man, a guerilla rather than a political
animal and this was regarded by Stalin as someone he could
trust. "^^
The Korean War enhanced Kim Il-sung's power base, espe-
cially after the Chinese entered the war with huge numbers
"^^FEER, 1980, p. 211.






of troops. It was at this point Kim Il-sung became very
annoyed with the Soviets, because after the initial build-
up of his army, very little additional support was given and
Kim Il-sung decided to emulate what he considered as the
best aspects of the two conflicting communist ideologies.
Since Kim Il-sung's pulling away from the Soviet camp,
there have existed periods of improving relations, but also
periods of relative "coolness".
The Soviet's major interest in Korea is to prevent its
domination by any other power. Its current attitude seems
to be only a reflection of its relationship with the other
major powers with interests in Korea. The USSR will react to
keep China from gaining too much influence and until the
recent United States condemnation of her invasion of
Afghanistan was very concerned with maintaining detente and
keeping the SALT negotiations alive. Now with SALT II having
been eliminated as a viable course of action, and detente
obviously at a new low, the Soviet Union could choose to
escalate the tensions in Northeast Asia. How could Russia
increase the level of anxiety of the other powers and still
keep her risks to a minimum? Her most productive policy
choice would be to sell to the DPRK, at reduced prices,
sophisticated military equipment, which the North has been





length of time that the North was the clearly dominant
miitary power. This would have the effect of upsetting the
military balance on the peninsula and would require South
Korea to invest more capital into her military-industrial
complex, thereby creating more inflation. This would even-
tually manifest itself into more dissatisfaction and social
unrest. The presence of substantial numbers of Mig 23-25s
and T-72 tanks would also have the effect of causing great
amounts of consternation and anxiety among the major powers
on the peninsula and would, in my opinion, draw the North
into a much closer relationship with the U.S.S.R.
China would also be forced to respond with increased
economic and military aid, which could endanger her success-
ful reapproachment with the United States . A strong USSR
program of aid and development to the DPRK would require
China to eventually make a choice between her "newly" formed
relationship with the United States or an all out retrench-
ment with the DPRK. China has already lost one such contest
vis a vis the Soviets in Vietnam, Is North Korea next?
If the Soviets did increase their aid programs and sold
sophisticated weapon systems to the North, the United States
would probably respond by announcing a continuation of U.S.
ground forces for the next five years or so. This would
also be in the Soviet favor. They privately support the "t\^^o"
Koreas concept and feel the Korean question should be solved
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in the same manner as the German question. That is, a
formal recognition by the great powers of North and South
Korea as separate entities. This would continue the stabil-
ity of the status quo, but the sale of weapon systems and
increased aid would increase the Soviet influence over the
North, and exacerbate "cold war" tensions in the area.
The Overall Equation
Any assessment of the physical military balance in Korea
leaves North Korea with the advantage. However, neither
side has the confidence in its ability to conquer the other
side, in a war without external support. The main advantage
in either case would be with the defender, who would have the
additional edge of in place fortifications, minefield, weapon
systems and preplanned fire support. This rough strategic
balance or what may be called "essential equivalence" is only
possible with the presence of American support forces at this
time. The United States' immediate concern should be to en-
sure that the balance between the two nations remains rela-
tively stable, with the long range goal (5 or more years or
ult 1985) of achieving "parity" for the South with gradual
removal of all U.S. forces.
The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons also has its effect,




leadership, but is it essential? I would suggest that they
are of limited utility because the North does not have
nuclear weapons, therefore, they do not serve as any sort
of deterrence except against conventional forces. The spec-
trum of the U.S., even using tactical nukes against a non-
nuclear country which is also within "spitting distance" of
the U.S.S.R. and China (see chart below) is illusionary at
best.











There really is no prima facie military requirement for
nuclear weapons to be deployed in South Korea and their
presence creates a dependency on such weaponry in the minds
of the South Korean leadership. The best thing that can be
said in favor of their deployment in South Korea is that it
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reduces the ROK's incentive to acquire nuclear weaponry
The relative levels of military strength of the two
Koreas is dependent upon their overall level of economic
Defense Monitor, p . 7
.
Leslie H. Brown, "American Security Policy in Asia,"
Adelphi Papers (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 31.
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progress. In this, the South has the greater advantage in
a rapidly expanding industrial and technological base. The
future of South Korea remains hitched to her economic star,
which will be examined now as one of the major variables




The development of an independent, democratic, economi-
cally free South Korea has been the focus of American policy
for over three decades. We can claim success in two of these
categories. In particular, the "economic miracle" on the Han
River has to rank as one of the most outstanding success
stories of international development. Is this success story
over? Have the rising costs of oil, labor, inflation and the
spectre of political instability ended Korea's growth as an
independent and self-sufficient economy? To answer these
questions and to understand where the future of Korea's
economy lies, we must look at the historical foundation and
development of that economy.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The gro\>;th of Korea's economy started off very slowly
after the Korean War and the reconstruction growth that did
occur at that time can be attributed to aid received from the
United States and the United Nations. Despite these large
capital inflows of foreign assistance in the post war period,
rapid inflation was the major problem in the domestic economy
The annual rate of inflation declined to 25-28 percent in
1953-54, from a high of 531 percent in 1951. In 1956, when
the annual rate was about 31 percent, the government agreed
56

with the United States aid mission to implement a financial
stabilization program beginning in late 1957. The effort
to stabilize the economy was directed mainly to the money
supply. The first target of this campaign was the large
government deficit which was a major source of expansion.
With this monetary stabilization program, the govern-
ment was able to reduce the annual growth of the money supply
48
to a 20 percent level in 1957 from 62 percent -in 1955.
The industrial policies at this time were inward looking
and a major effort was being put forth to reconstruct the
industrial base destroyed during the war. The government was
maintaining very high tariffs to protect its infant indus-
tries and some export promotion measures were undertaken.
The export level was slowly growing, but remained at mini-
scule level throughout the 1950s.
During the entire post war period, all major economic
policy decisions were made jointly by the Korean government
and the U.S. aid mission to Korea. It becomes a point for
speculation whether these policies reflected the goals of
the U.S. aid authorities or the Korean government.
The Growth Years (1961-1975)
The year 1961 brought several major changes to Korea.
First, there was a military coup in May 1961 that gradually
evolved into a one man rule. The military government, led
Kim, K. and Roemer, M. , The Transformation of the Korean
Economy
,
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 45.
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by Major General Park Chung Hee that ruled the first three
years after the coup, managed the economy as an integral
and vital part of a garrison state. A strong economy was
seen as an indispensable part of the country's overall pos-
ture in relation to the DPRK (North Korea). The government's
consistent attitude from 1961 on has been that economic
49
competition is deadlier than war.
As a result of the emphasis on Korea's economy, the mili-
tary government created the first formal five year plan. The
plan was geared to attain an annual growth rate of 7.1 per-
cent during the period 1962-1966. The basic goal was to
create a viable economic base for industrialization and self-
sustained growth. In view of its poor economic performance
in the 1950s, the plan appeared to be overly optimistic, but
it was readily accepted by a highly industrious and literate
population that was prepared to work hard. The 7.1 percent
growth rate was obtained and exceeded during this first five
year plan and Korea was on its way to an economic "miracle".
The growth rate in the first five year plan was an encouraging
7.8 percent. Following the success of the first five year
plan, the second and third five year plans were formulated
Nena Vreeland, Ed., Area Handbook for South Korea
(DA PAJl 550-41), 1975), p. 215.
Kim and Roemer, p. 44.
^
"Korea - The Miracle on the Han River'.' Euromoney
,
April 1977, p. 4.
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and implemented by the government. All of these plans were
linked with one basic policy goal; export-oriented indus-
trialization and growth. All other policy goals were either
5 2
consistent with or secondary to this main objective.
The rapid growth of the Korean economy in the 1960s can
be attributed to a variety of economic and non-economic
factors, whose relative importance is difficult to determine.
First and foremost was the abundance of quality labor. The
rapid development of Korea's economy was possible, at least
in the initial stage, because of Korea's comparative advantage
in cheap, quality labor. The wages in Korea in the 1960s
were approximately one seventh of the cost for an equally
53
skilled Japanese laborer. However, abundant supply of
quality labor alone does not insure a rapid pace of develop-
ment. A high level of investment must take place if the
surplus labor is to be utilized for production. In the ini-
tial stages of the plan, U.S. foreign aid accounted for 83
percent of the foreign investment in 1962, but had dropped
to 4.6 percent during 1972-1976.^^ (See Table 3 on page 60.)
The major foreign investors in Korea's economy today are
the United States and Japan. The focus on development of
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U.S.A. 36.6 38.9 22.7
Japan 19.1 18.4 63.8
E.G. Countries 6.3 30.1 7.9
Germany 4.0 6.1 1.1
France 1.1 9.7 0.4
Italy — 10.6 0.1
Netherlands — 0.5 6.3
Int'l Organizations 38.0 0.6 —
Others 12.0 5.6
Source: Economic Planning Board
of Korea's industrial base could not have been accomplished
without heavy foreign investment and the mobilization of
domestic savings. During a seven year period ending in
1972, private long term borrowing abroad and private foreign
investment accounted for nearly 47 percent of the financing
of fixed assets in the corporate sector, and at the peak in
1971 for over 70 percent. Over half this credit has been
extended by Japan and the United States.
In terms of the GNP during the first half of the 1960s,
foreign savings were roughly 7 percent of the GNP. Howrever,
by 1970, it had risen to a high of 9.7 percent and declined
1 *. 56m later years.
55Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 224.
56 KIEI, Handbook, p. 465.
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At the beginning o£ the rapid growth years of the 1960s,
the level of national savings were extremely low. Due to
this low level of domestic savings (see Table 4 below) at
the start of the rapid growth period, savings could not
catch up with the rapidly rising investment ratio during the
second half of the 1960s, even though the marginal savings
rate was 25-30 percent. However, the sustained increase in
the domestic savings ratio has resulted in the reduced




1960 1965 1970 1976
(1) Ratio of Gross
Investment to GNP 11 15 27 25.0
(2) Rate of Domestic
Savings to GNP 4 8 16 22.3
(3) I-S Gap (1-2) 7 7 11 2.7
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook
Industrial Policies
As a nation confronted with a distinct lack of domestic
resources, both agricultural and mineral resources, and
faced with large foreign trade deficits, the South Korean
economic planners of the early 1960s, using Japan as a guide,
adapted a twofold industrial approach to achieve acceptable
rates of economic growth. One approach was to develop a
sustained manufacturing capability for export using imported
61

raw materials and the other was the replacement of imported
goods with domestic products. This Korean approach to
economic growth has proven to be highly successful.
The government has provided these internal industries
substantial protective measures by providing protection
against foreign imports and providing large subsidies for
firms whose products are exports. The domestic market has
also been amply protected by direct controls. South Korean
manufacturers also benefit by a complex system of export
incentives; exemptions from duties on certain imports, and
vaious other allowances. The cost to the government for
these subsidies has mounted rapidly and it was estimated by
1970 that they amounted to almost one-third of the total
value of exports.
The results obtained from these protective policies and
government controls has been extremely impressive. During
the first 16 years since the start of the five year develop-
ment plans, Korea's exports have grown at a towering rate of
37 percent per year.
Exports/ Imports
Exports are Korea's life blood, but are more than matched
in size by imports. From 1962 to 1973, the period covering
the first two 5 year plans, Korea's economy ran a persistent
57Vreeland, Area Handbook, p. 224
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balance of payments deficit. This deficit has been financed
by foreign investment and more importantly, by borrowing.
Imports have largely out-paced exports until 1969, the
year when exports grew at a nominal rate of 36.7 percent
against an import rate of 24.7 percent. In 1974, the trade
gap worsened considerably as a result of the oil crisis of
1973. The rise in oil prices produced a surge to 61.6 per-
cent in imports while exports grew to 38.3 percent. In that
year, Korea's trade deficit grew almost seven times to more
than 2 billion. The years of 1974-75 were mostly a testing
time for Korea. The fall of Vietnam, the oil crisis and
the closure of all the medium term Euromarkets to all but
the most credit worthy of borrowers, forced Korea to fund
very heavily in the short term markets. In these years,
other nations suffered drastic recessions, or at a minimum,
breaks in their rates of economic growth, while Korea con-
tinued its expansionist policies and continued to develop her
economy. This was not done without great risks, as Korea
came close to being forced to default on debts to the out-
5 8
side world in the early part of 1975.
Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976)
The third five year plan presented an assessment for
potential growth of the nation's economy, related economic
^^Smith, Financial Times Survey, April 1979
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objectives, and a consistent set of policies and means to
reach these objectives. It recognized the strains to the
economy, reflected in the heavy dependence on foreign
capital, the growing disparity in income and productivity
between the industrial sector and the lagging agricultural
rural sector, and the continuing problem of inflation.
The basic development strategy of the third five year
plan was to further the transformation and expansion of the
industrial structure at a high, but somewhat slower and more
stable rate. The plan also proposed to further the rapid
expansion of exports and substitute domestic products for
imports, thereby reducing net foreign capital inflows.
The disparity of incomes between the industrial areas,
mainly Seoul and Pusan, and the countryside was recognized
and became a major target of the third plan with the following
specific goals:
"--Self-sufficiency in food was to be attained; the in-
comes of farmers and fishermen were to be increased; and
paddy consolidation and agricultural mechanization were to be
facilitated.
--Health, sanitation and cultural facilities in the rural
areas were to be improved and expanded; rural electrification




--The general welfare and livelihood o£ the people were
to be improved by expanding and improving housing, health
and sanitation facilities and social security.
--Regional development and decentralization of indus-
tries and population were to be expedited through efficient
and effective utilization of national land resources, such
as the establishment of industrial estates and export
59industrial parks."
One of the major vehicles was to be a program called
Saemaul Undong (meaning new community) movement. The rural
areas had worked in a predetermined schedule for centuries.
In the Spring, plant rice seed beds and plow the rice
paddies; Summer was the time for planting and weeding, and
in the Fall it was the harvest. Winter was reserved for
light handicrafts and repairs. Saemaul Undong placed em-
phasis on construction of roads, irrigation facilities and
income boosting projects undertaken mostly in the slack
months after the harvest. It was a "self-help" campaign,
which brought the income levels of the rural areas more in
line with the urban workers. The government aided village
projects with low cost loans for projects and introduced
new high yield strains of rice.
In 1975, the country succeeded in reaching self-
sufficiency in barley, however, the overall grain supply was
^^KIEI, Handbook, p. 467
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twenty-five percent short because of the negligible quanti-
ties of wheat and corn cultivated at home.
The Korean government is now encouraging farmers to
begin production of livestock and dairy farming. This is
expected to offset the import of beef and mutton from
Australia.
Actual Performance : During the -third plan, the agriculture,
forestry and fishing sector grew by 5.9 percent. Rice was an
unexpected surprise and far exceeded the original projected
growth rate of 4.5 percent. This sector grew with a record
high of 8.9 percent in 1976.
The economy itself averaged an 11.2 percent increase
during the planning period, which was substantially higher
than the 8.6 percent projected for that period. The GNP
in 1976 was more than 20 billion dollars and per capita in-
come was more than 600 dollars.
Fourth Five Year Plan(1977- 1981)
In the fourth five year plan, the emphasis will be
placed on structural changes in the industrial sector. The
major goals are outlined below:
--"to achieve a further shift in the industrial sector
stressing the heavy chemical industry, especially machinery
and electronics.





--to improve the distribution of benefits of growth by
maintaining the growth of employment and broadening the
availability of essential services including health and
sanitation, education, housing and electricity,.
Major Growth Targets:
--GNP will expand at 9.2°^ annually.
--Per capita GNP will increase from $532 in 1975 to
$1,512 in 1981.
--Mining and manufacturing, growing at 14.2% per annum,
will account for 40.9% of the GNP in 1981,
--Agricultural, forestry and fishing will account for
18.5% of the GNP in 1981.
--Social overhead capital and other services will account
for 40.6% of the GNP in 1981.
--Commodity exports will reach $20.2 billion and com-
modity imports $18.9 billion in 1981."^*^
These goals recognize the changing nature of the Korean
economy. Korean labor, once possibly the cheapest to be
found in any Asian country, is no longer particularly cheap
by regional standards. The solution to this problem is to
switch from labor-intensive products to more technology-
intensive products, thereby upgrading the productivity of
labor. If the switch can be made evenly and cleanly, it
Korea Trade Promotion Pamphlet , 1977.
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will not block long-term growth prospects for the
economy.
The fourth five year plan calls for a more moderate
growth rate of 9.2 percent. This probably will be achieved,
but will require applying the "brakes" with a tight money
policy. This is in reaction to the major problem with
Korea's economy today, namely, inflation . The official cost
of living index showed a 14.4 percent increase in calendar
year 1978, but unofficial sources estimate it at closer to
20-25 percent.
The immediate cause of these high inflation figures is
the large amounts of capital inflow from Korea's Middle East
construction projects. The money supply rose by 40% in 1977
and is still increasing at an approximate rate of 20-25 per-
cent. This occurred despite a freeze of repatriation and a




As seen earlier, the United States and Japan are by far
the heaviest investors in the Korean economy. Then, it
should come as no surprise that they are also their largest
trading partners for both imports and exports.
What are Korea's imports? Being a country whose exports
lead its economy and having hardly any natural resources.
Smith, Financial Times Survey, April 1979
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raw materials make up the greater portion of Korea's imports.
Raw materials represented 71 percent of the imports during
the first seven months of 1977, The largest single item of
import was crude oil, at 23 percent of the total followed by
timber at 5 percent and food grains at 3.5 percent. Other
products which are heavily imported are iron ore, scrap iron,
natural rubber, wool and copper ore.
Seven categories of manufactured items make up the major
part of their export items C65%) during the first seven
months of 1978. These seven categories were textiles,
electronic goods and components, footwear, steel products,
plywood, steel hulled ships and synthetic resin products.
Presently, key heavy industry export items are tankers,
automobiles, machinery and petrochemical products.
Korea's economy has matured into a prosperous and self-
reliant entity, but faces some severe tests in the immediate
future. Inflation continues to be the nation's primary
problem, but a perceived slow-down in export growth is also
63
causing some concern.
There are many factors behind this export slow-down.
The reinstatement of direct controls by Korea's trading
partners is a major cause. For example, a recent listing
^^KIEI, "A Handbook of Korea", p. 467.




which may not be complete, shows 67 trade barriers imposed
against Korean goods, of which 28 have been applied since
January 197 /
.
Other problems for the economy mainly stem from in-
creased labor costs and the continued price climb of crude
oil, on which they are highly dependent. At current oil
prices, Seoul's oil bill will nearly double to U.S. $6
billion, in contrast to U.S. $3.2 billion in 1979.
Currently, the major portion of Korea's electricity is
produced by oil fueled power plants, but Korea's economic
planners having long been cognizant of the oil situation,
have three nuclear power plants operating or are in the
final stages of construction, with many more planned for the
future
.
If South Korea can enact controls to control the over-
heating caused by inflation, the economy will remain strong
and viable, and the future should bring continuing prosperity
64Korean Times , August 1978, p. 1.
Far East Economic Review, February 8, 1980.
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VI. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS (1955-1980)
The recent assassination of President Park Chung Hee
brought to an end an eighteen year rule which transformed
Korea from the ranks of one of the poorest nations in Asia
to one of the most advanced. But the road v/hich the Korean
nation has traveled upon has been a long and arduous one,
with many road blocks. iMuch of the same type of political
crisis was faced in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as con-
fronts the nation today, but Korea at that time was found
to be lacking the necessary cohesiveness required in a
democratic form of government.
The Republic of Korea at the conclusion of the Korean
War had serious economic, political and social problems.
Inflation and unemployment were rampant and President Rhee
was frantically trying to hold onto power by amending the
constitution and democracy in any form, was rapidly dis-
appearing. The breaking point was reached in the elections
of 1960. There were flagrant irregularities in this elec-
tion and the people did not recognize the legitimacy of the
elected administration and a series of demonstrations took
place throughout the country. The result was martial law,
but the troops who were sent to prevent the demonstrations,
jomea them instead.
Woo-Keun-Han, The History of Korea (University Press
of Hawaii, 1970), pp. 507-510
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President Rhee finally stepped down and a caretaker
government was formed. A new constitution was drafted and
adopted and in June 1960, elections were held and the new
government formed. John Chang became the Prime Minister
which was the most important post of the new government and
Yun Po-Son became the President, but only with "ceremonial"
67powers
.
John Chang's democratic government turned out to be a
great disappointment to the Korean people, who had had
great expectations after the repressive government of
Syngman Rhee. The Chang government was faced with insur-
mountable problems, which it was ill equipped to handle.
There was a strong demand for popular participation in
politics and at the same time demands for increased social
welfare and a rising standard of living.
The "failure of democracy" was obvious to all and on
16 May 1961, a military coup d'etat was skillfully and
bloodlessly executed by Major General Park Chung Hee. The
major reason that the coup was bloodless was that the
majority of the people and the military realized that the
government was corrupt, faction ridden and did not repre-
sent the people. The newly established military junta
declared that; "their motive was purely patriotic - to
cleanse the governm^ent of corruption and incompetent
^^Edward Reynolds Wright, Ed., Korean Politics in Tran -
sition CSeattle: University of Washington Press, ly/bj, p. 28
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elements and to restore public order.... It was claimed
that the objectives of the 'May 16th Military Revolution'
were identical with those of the student uprisings in 1960
- the establishment of a clean, open, just and democratic
South Korea."
The military at that time was also the largest body of
intelligensia of the nation. They were well trained in
modern manag:erial and problem, solving techniques and applied
these methods to the country's problem areas, but mainly to
the economy. The strong role of the military has been much
debated over the years, even when it was "civilianized" in
1963, when General Park took off his uniform and narrowly
won the election. As noted, President Park's major contri-
bution to the Korean nation was the modernization of the
economy and the concomitant establishment of a strong
industrial base. Park, throughout his regime received his
major support from the rural areas. This was because of
the major efforts that he made to correct the imbalance of
income distribution, which went largely to the urban
dweller. Ke did this through the policy of government con-
trolled prices for farm products, which allowed the rural
dwellers to share in the nation's growing prosperity. How-
ever, economic well-being also brought increased education
and a growing awareness of the increasingly literate
^^Vreeland, Area Handbook, pp. 169-170
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population that the people should be allowed to partic-
pate more in the formation of government planning and
policy. This is an extremely simplified version of the
real changes that the majority of the Korean population
were going through. Korea has a strong Confucian cultural
heritage, and with the increased standard of living, the
possession of material goods, there has been a fundamental
conflict between the old ways and the new xvesternized style
that pervaded even into the Korean political scene. Con-
fucianism beliefs stem from the old adage that "filial
piety is the basis for all conduct" to the philosophy that
hierarchy and harmony and communal obligations, and these
stem from the Confucian rules, which are the basis for all
relationships, including the subordination of son to
father, younger brother to older brother, wife to husband,
69
and subject to state .
Confucianism is a philosophical justification of
government by a virtuous ruler. Virtue in a ruler ensures
harmony between man and nature, ensures obedience within a
stratified society. Also, "Possessing virtue will give the
ruler the people. Possessing the people will give him the
territory. Possessing the territory will give him its
Christian Science Monitor , "South Korea: A Conflict
of Fathers and Sons," June 4, 1980.
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wealth. Possessing the wealth he will have the resources
for expenditure. Virtue is the root, wealth is the
result. "^°
The Korean emphasis on Confucianism creates contra-
dictory forces within the modernizing society of today. A
large part of the population, especially in the rural
villages, still adheres to this philosophy and Park Chung
Hee, whose roots came from one of these rural villages,
moulded his regime after Confucian precepts.
Westernized concepts of individual rights and freedoms
go against these traditional concepts and still have not
been totally accepted by the people. The result under
President Park Chung Hee was a bastardized form of demo-
cracy. This "Koreanized democracy" consisted of virtually
all facets of government. This dictatorial form of govern-
ment was slowly brought into creation with the starting
point being the passage, in 1969, of a constitutional
amendment that allowed Park to run for a third term. Again
he won by a narrow margin and President Park's moves toward
complete authoritarianism began in earnest. In 1971, during
a period of anti-government demonstrations, President Park
declared a state of emergency. Following this he pushed
through a law which would be called the "Yushin" or re-




presidential term from four to six years and created a new
political body, the National Conference for Unification.
The NCU's sole mission was to elect the President by secret
ballot and to approve the President's appointment of one-
third of its membership. This blatant manipulation of the
political machinery has caused a series of dissident acti-
vities throughout the years, but President Park had managed
to retain power by means of supplementary emergency decrees,
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until his assassination on October 26, 1979.
His legacy leaves Korea with two political parties, the
Democratic Republican party, the standard bearer for the
government and the New Democrats, the opposition party.
The government parties have traditionally stressed national
security, ant i -communism and political stability, whereas
the "opposition" party had lobbied for a more liberal
democracy, respect for individual rights and freedom and
72
more social programs. But in Korea today, the leadership
of both parties is either under arrest, on trial, or has
permanently retired from political life.
The main figure behind all the recent political uphea-
vals is the former General Chun Du Hwan, who recently
ascended to the Presidency by means of a rubber-stamped
7 1
Robert Shaplen, A Turning Wheel (New York: Random
House, 1979) .
72
Wright, Korean Politics, p. 48.
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election conducted by the National Council for Reunifica-
tion, the South Korean version of an Electoral College.
President Chun, 49, was a relatively obscure Major
General before President Park's assassination last October
26, but shortly thereafter, he rose to prominence as the
head of the Defense Security Command. On the night of
December 12, General Chun, who was in charge of investiga-
ting the presidential assassination, staged a military coup,
when he arrested General Chung Seung-hwa, his superior, who
has since been sentenced to seven years in prison for al-
73legedly having played a part in the assassination.
Subsequent to the military coup. Major General Chun
purged the military of forty high ranking officers whom he
considered to be corrupt and incompetent.
There are rumors that these actions were brought about
by Chun's fear that. General Chung and the older generals,
some who had been on the active list for the last twenty-
74five years, intended to displace Chun and his associates
75by sending them to obscure military posts. This service
rivalry stems from the fact that Major General Chun was a
leading figure in the first class of officers to graduate
from the four year military academy in 1956. That class,
"^^
New York Times , 15 April 1980, p. A9
.
Christian Science Monitor , 31 July, 1980, p. 10.
"^^
Monterey Peninsula Herald (AP) , 17 August 1980, p. 2.
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number 11, considers itself to be the nation's true mili-
tary elite and looked down upon the older officers who had
graduated from the short, six month officer course, before
7 f\
and during the Korean War. It should also be noted here
that in Korean society, next to the family, one's class-
mates require the strongest loyalty and fidelity. The
spirit and closeness generated by that association is of
primary importance throughout one's life and it is obvious
that General Chun has emerged as Class 11 's leader and
mentor. This is further evidenced by the rapidity that
Chun has promoted his followers, some as high as Lieutenant
General and the key posts that they now occcupy in his
government.
After the December 12 coup. General Chun quickly con-
solidated his power, reducing the position of President
Choi Kyu Hah to a figurehead. The method Chun used was to
establish a "Special Committee for National Security
Measures," (SCNSM) , which essentially gave him the power of
implementation over all government policies and activities.
This de-facto junta ran counter to U.S. hopes and efforts
to bring about democratic rule to South Korea. The United
States had repeatedly attempted to influence the situation
by warning the military to keep a low profile and to stay





move toward a more liberal and broadly based government.
General Chun was probably responding to these efforts last
7 8May, when he insisted: "I have no political ambitions."
But his quick and highly successful behind the scenes
I
maneuvering indicates that Chun is an astute politician as
well as a highly successful and popular military leader.
Through SCNSM, General Chun has conducted numerous
"purification" drives highly reminiscent of Park Chung Hee '
s
actions with the "Supreme Council for National Reconstruc-
tion", which was the country's highest governing body
following the May 16, 1961 military coup. The SCNR also
"enacted several measures designed to rid the country of
hoodlums, curb subversive activities and to improve the
79political climate and economic conditions." At that time
some 35,000 government employees were dismissed on grounds
of corruption or incompetence and were replaced mainly with
8 n
active or retired military personnel.
In comparison. President Chun's purification measures
have yielded: - more than 30,000 "hooligans" and other
^^
Los Angeles Times , 1 June 1980
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- has removed more than 300 agents accused of corrup-
tion, high-handedness and incompetence from the KCIA ranks.
Along with the KCIA "purges", there were 1,355 police
officers dismissed, 1,544 employees of provincial govern-
ments, 441 from the Seoul metropolitan administration, 385
from the National Tax Administration and 149 from the
8 2National Custom authority.
- listed for ostracism were some 232 higher ranking
civil servants, including one Cabinet member, 38 of vice
8 3
ministerial level and 34 of the grade 1 level.
- the Korean Newspaper Association has h&en forced to
"purge" at least 400 "unreliable" journalists, this in-
84
eluded some of the most respected editors in the country.
- the press, radio and television are more thoroughly
controlled than at any time except for the most stringent
8 5days of the Park regime.
- the "three" Kims , who were most commonly regarded "
as contestants for the Presidency have each suffered
^•^Time , 8 September 1980, p. 37.
^^New York Times , 16 July 1980, p. A2
.
8 3
Foreign Broadcast Information Service ( FBIS ) , Vol. IV,
No. 135, p. 30.
84
Time , 8 September 1980, A2
.
^^Christian Science Monitor , 14 August 1980, p. 1.
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different fates and were eliminated from political
contention,
Kim Jong Pil was accused of corruption and embezzlement
of government funds and was put under house arrest. Even-
tually, he was forced to pay a fine and to give up all of
his positions. He is now retired from politics and lives
a cloistered private life.
Kim Young Sam, the South Korean opposition leader of
the New Democratic Party, who had been under house arrest
since last May, recently resigned from his position saying
that he will also resign from politics because of his
failure to fulfill his responsibility as the parliamentary
8 7
oppositions leader.
It has been rumored that General Chun had two major
objectives when he came into power. One was to eliminate
the assassinated President Park's nemesis, opposition
party leader Kim Dae Jung from the political scene, and the
second was to see through to a conclusion the execution of
former KCIA director and Presidential assassin Kim Jae Kyu.
Both of these objectives have been accomplished, but the
arrest of Kim Dae Jung, in conjunction with a sweeping
martial law decree set off outright insurrection in Kwanju
City, South Cholla province. Kim Dae Jung is a native of
Ibid .
^^Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 1980, p. 2
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this traditionally poor province and it has always been the
seat of his political power. The martial law investigators
issued a 14 page report in which they say that they have
evidence that Kim Dae Jung planned to overthrow the govern-
ment. Under South Korean law, sedition charges can lead
8 8
to the death penalty.
Kim and 23 others accused of attempting to overthrow
the government went before a military court martial begin-
ning on 14 August, at Army Headquarters. Specifically,
they were charged with, "organizing the Union of Democratic
Youths as an agit-prop support network in support of his
anti-government struggle following the October 26 assas-
sination of Pak Chong-hui last year. Kim and his followers
apparently saw the demise of President Pak as the advent
of a good chance for them to seize power, the prosecutor
u A t.89charged."
The fate of Kim Dae Jung will probably turn out to be
the most crucial decision of President Chun's political
career. The Korean people and the international community
will most likely judge President Chun and his new govern-
ment on the outcome of that trial. For whatever Kim Dae
Jung is currently made out to be, the former Presidential
candidate enjoys wide popularity at home and abroad by
^^New York Times , 23 May 1980, p. A8
^^FBIS, 14 August 1980, p. El.
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supporters who regard him to be a "Champion of democracy .
"
There exists a definite feeling of concern by many of
Korea's allies and the charges have been described as
"pretty far-fetched" by the U.S. State Department . ^^
Even China, in the August 4, 1980 Beijing Review
,
saw
fit to criticize General Chun's motives and the handling of
the Kim Dae Jung affair. That article states:
"Kim Dae Jung and eight other democrats were put on
'trial' before an army tribunal for 'high treason'
by Chun Du Hwan and his associates after suppressing
the popular uprising in Kwanju, South Korea.
Chun Du Hwan wants to physically eliminate Kim
Dae Jung, not because the latter is guilty of any
capital crime. Chun wants Kim out of the way so
that he can resuscitate the odious Pak Jung Hi
tyranny.... Now Chun Du Hwan is trying to complete
what his mentor could not... the demand for democ-
racy, freedom and the reunification of their
country by the people must h^.answered and Chun Du
Hwan and company cannot stop this..."
There is some evidence that President Chun is becoming
concerned with all the adverse publicity that the military
trial has generated and that the dissident Kim Dae Jung
may well be turned over to the civil courts to be tried.
The standard legal procedure for a guilty verdict will be
an appeal through a second military court and then on to
the supreme court of South Korea. The case is expected to
continue for several months and if Kim Dae Jung is given
the sentence of death and it is confirmed through the
^*^Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 1980, p. 2.
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legal procedures, President Chun still has the power to
commute it to life imprisonment. But, if President Chun
Du Hwan presses for the death penalty and carried through
with the execution. South Korea would probably convulse
into continuous chaos and bloodshed.
In the face of this state of affairs, our Secretary
of State Muskie declared that he was, "deeply concerned
that South Korea was moving away from liberalizing poli-
91
cies." The problem for the United States is that there
has been a steady atrophy of the amount of influence that
can be brought to bear on South Korea, who has in turn
become a fairly independent nation. The major bargaining
chips that remain are:
1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces.
2. Withdrawal of specialized weapon systems (nuclear
and conventional)
.
5. Curtailment of arms sales and related support
concomitant with a holdback of technology.
South Korea highly values all of these factors, but it
is doubtful if the removal or threat of removal would be
sufficient to bring about a change in attitude or direc-
tion of South Korea's current leadership. Also, it would
seem inappropriate to withdraw these forces or instigate
other actions which would undermine the overall deterrent
^•''Time Magazine, 2 June 19 80, pp. 37-38
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value, when it is needed the most . The United States is
once again thrust upon the horns of a dilemma. Should the
U.S. support another authoritarian ruler in South Korea?
Or should we extract our forces and risk our international
credibility?
If we are fortunate, neither of these options will come
to pass. Former President Choi, who resigned on August 16,
had made certain promises to the Korean people. These
included a revision of the "Yushin" or "revitalizing"
constitution and that national elections would be held in
1981. These statements were looked upon with skepticism
at the time they were made, because of the continuation of
martial law and the apparent consolidation of the military's
power. But at General Chun's inaugural ceremonies, the
new President pledged a constitutional referendum would
be held before the end of October and that martial law
would be lifted before the new presidential election, now
9 2
scheduled for June 1981. Chun's statements reaffirm
former President Choi's statements on both issues. This is
an exceptionally good omen for the future of Korean poli-
tics. Legally, President Chun could serve out the remaining
portion of the assassinated President Park's term, which
does not expire until 1984. Therefore, President Chun has
put before himself the goal of winning an election, albeit
^^Christian Science Monitor, 2 September 1980, p. 12
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an indirect election by June 1981. President Chun's
"purification" campaign has cultivated his image as a
"social reformer", which has proved to be basically popu-
lar in a country long accustomed to authoritarian rule.
But diplomats and some influential Koreans have privately
counselled President Chun that unless he softens his stand,
he will soon face the same internal opposition that haunted
q T
President Park during his final months.
President Chun's popularity will have to pass its first
uncontrolled test when the universities reopen, which they
are scheduled to do late in September 1980.
Korean college students, in conjunction with the mili-
tary, have to be rated as one of the most potent political
forces in the ROK. They repeatedly have demonstrated their
ability to act as a powerful pressure group, even though
their lack of a coherent coordinated program somewhat
limits their overall efficiency.
Nevertheless, they managed to jeopardize and eventually
topple the Rhee government in 1960, and later drove the
country to the verge of anarchy, which brought the military
forces into power, and were the foremost opponents of
President Park's ROK-Japan treaty. Eventually, they were
^•^U.S. News 5 World Report, 8 September 1980, p. 32.
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able to bring about the forces which toppled Park Chung
r- 94Hee from power.
The students, whom many seem to think of as reflecting
the soul of the Korean people, have seen successive
authoritarian governments which suffer from a lack of
legitimacy and participation. Elections have been tainted
with irregularities and the governments which have stayed
in power have been plagued by widespread corruption- and
favoritism, which has indirectly contributed to an uneven
distribution of wealth.
These are serious problems and constitute some of the
basic grievances of the students today. However, the main
ingredient of the Korean student movements consist of
nationalism , which includes both anti-foreign influences
and the reunification issue. Also, the democracy problem
or anti-authoritarianism is especially prevalent in the
younger generation and for the students. It is at the
center of all the problems. Unfortunately, they have
usually succeeded in mortally wounding their own causes by
demanding too much too soon, thereby giving the other
major political force - the military, the opportunity to
shut the doors of democracy in the name of security.
Kwan Bong Kim, The Korean-Japan Treaty Crisis and the






The issues raised by the student movement are largely-
representative of all the socio-economic strata of Korean
society, therefore, they are relevant to the aspirations
of the entire nation. Since their movement has a great
degree of historical and social validity, it strengthens
the overall legitimacy of their protests. The students
have always been the vanguard of political movement in
Korea and feel that they have a distinctive and righteous
role to play in national affairs. The excessive role the
students do have in Korean politics reflects the political
and social instability of the current and past systems.
The question then becomes, "How will President Chun
Du Hwan's governmental system differ from the past and
what are the national objectives?" The best information
available to answer those questions is from an interview
given by Chun Du Hwan to Yi Chin-wi, President of the
Munwha Broadcasting Company, which was reported in the
English version of the Korea Herald on 12 August 1980,
page 5, in which Chun Du Hwan says:
"....our national objective should be the creation
of a democratic welfare state. Strange as it may
sound, it should be our new objective, more con-
cretely, we should Koreanize democracy, first and
foremost
.
Democracy is a universal value. We should make
joint efforts to materialize the value. However,
ways of realizing the value cannot be the same.
The maturity of democracy cannot be the same as in
Western society, which has Christianity as its cul-
tural background and long democratic traditions.
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and the Oriental society which has a different
cultural background. If a Western version of
a democracy should be transplanted in an Oriental
society, it will not take root. An imitation of
democracy is incapable of meeting society's needs.
It merely invites social unrest and poverty and
stagnation. Now we find ourselves in a new* era
and we should create and develop a new version of
democracy which is suitable to our political
climate... In our society, some radical democrats
or doctrinaires have discouraged the tailoring of
democracy to our needs by holding a Western version
of democracy as absolute truth. They have not
assimilated democracy fully.
Speaking of culture, we should not imitate
Western culture unconditionally but assimilate,
modify and accept it. This does not mean we are
exclusive but that we esteem ourselves and our
determination to Koreanize democracy should be de-
veloped into a resolve to defeat communism and
achieve national unification. .
.
Second, we should launch policies aimed at
building a welfare state. We should make steady
developments in order to establish a firm self-
reliant system both in defense and economy. But
the quality of the people's livelihood should not
continue to be sacrificed. In this decade, such
full-fledged welfare programs as a comprehensive
medical insurance, retirement insurance and unem-
ployment insurance should be implemented. We
should also implement welfare programs in such a
way as to enable all the people to benefit from
developments ... .Our national objectives should be
the Koreanization of democracy and the creation
of a just society in which welfare programs are
implemented.
Q: What will the new political order be like
and what will be outlined in the new constitution?
A: We have learned a great lesson since the
assassination of President Chong-hee last October
26. With the loss of the focus of power, the
nation became like a kite without its string. The
discipline of the bureaucracy loosened and the
Saemaul campaign entered into the doldrums. The
growth of the nation's economy, once termed as
miraculous, receded into a minus growth within
several months. There was a real danger that the
89

entire Korean society would retrogress by several
decades without a strong leadership. This is why
a presidential system is deemed ideal * for the
nation's stability and continued growth
.
Apart from the lesson of last October 26, it
is very clear what kind of political order there
should be in this country, which confronts an
enemy in the northern part of the peninsula. In
order to survive under these circumstances, we
have to rally all our forces. Given this reality,
a parliamentary government cannot insure stability,
and a dual executive system is likely to bring
about confusion...
The two major tasks facing the next presiden-
tial election, will be how to eliminate corrup-
tion and most effectively reflect national opinion.
I understand that indirect election is being
considered for the next president. However, it
should not be in the nature of a confidence vote
for a specific person as done by the National
Conference for unification in the past. It should
guarantee a free competition of candidates in
order to reflect national opinion.
Q: Will there be any change in the proposed
political schedule?
A: We should stick to the timetable as an-
nounced by the President (at that time it was still
Choi Kyu Hah) . . . For National security as well as
economic development, the sooner the transitional
situation is over, the better.
Q: The role of Intellectuals will be particu-
larly important in the creating of a new era and
new history. What do you think the roles of
journalists, cultural leaders and scholars should
be?
A; ...the main function of intellectuals
should be criticizing social irregularities. How-
ever, criticisms should be constructive ones and
they should not be designed to destroy the nation.
(Underlining added by the author for emphasis)
90

...Accordingly, I call on Korean intellec-
tuals to refrain from indulging in criticizing
the government and fully participate in the
building of a nation state."
The Ministry of Culture and Information has deemed this
interview so important, that 200,000 copies are being
printed and distributed to leading personages in every
spectrum of society.
To reiterate, the main points of President Chun's pro- -i-
gram are:
(1) The construction of a welfare state.
(2) Stability of the nation.
(3) Development of a new presidential system.
(4) Early end to transitional measures, with elections
in June, 1981.
(5) Establishment of a new political climate through
social reform.
Even though President Chun has promised these
"Koreanized" democratic reforms, many observers are still
convinced that he will continue to use the outward forms
of a constitutional government merely as a facade of
legitimacy for a tough authoritarian regime. But the Korean
people, if given a choice between Kim Il-sung or President
Chun Du Hwan, v;ill obviously still choose the latter.
The Korean nation currently stands at the crossroads of
decision. Should they again take to the streets and risk
^^FBIS, 14 August 1980, p. E4.
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their very lives as they did in Kwanju last May or should
they accept Chun Du Hwan for the moment, and see if he
carries out his promises of a short transitional government
with constitutional reforms and presidential elections next
June. But in the eyes of South Korea's student population,
President Chun has already confirmed their worst fears. The
students can see a reenactment of the political developments
of the 1960s, where the leaders of the May 16 military coup
firmly entrenched themselves into the government bureaucracy
with promises of a steady transition toward a more demo-
cratic government, which remained unfulfilled.
The coming months will be very important in determining
if Chun Du Hwan has the popular support to construct a
viable government, thus enabling him to enact laws, which
would "Koreanize" democracy and establish his envisioned
welfare state. President Chun also faces several possible
crisis situations with unknown outcomes. These could under-
mine his current government and might ultimately determine
the direction of democracy. First, there is the problem
of what to do with Kim Dae Jung and second, will Korea's
economy stabilize or does the future hold more inflation and
possible labor unrest. The third crisis situation must be
faced later this month when the universities open. Will
the students start to demonstrate again or has President Chun
convinced them that the current government is progressive and
viable and that it will proceed with the promised reforms.
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Within living memory we have seen Korea metamorphisize
from a Confucian dynasty, to an occupied colony, to an
idealogically divided nation, civil war and the establish-
ment of two separate Korean nations. South Korea has con-
tinued this dynamic process with political revolution,
military coups, and Presidential assassination to become a
fairly modern, industrial based country, albeit still some-
what instable politically. The Korean people are now faced
with another opportunity to demand a truly democratic form
of government, They can no 'longer look to the United States
to influence their country's leadership. All the United —
.
States can do is to try and provide a suitable environment
for establishment of a democratic process. It is the Korean
people's responsibility to make it grow. It is time they —
took the risk to start the process.
If the Korean people can pass through this current
political crisis and successfully transfer power through an
elective process that reflects popular public opinion, then j__
they will have taken a major step in the direction of a
more mature and liberal type of government.
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VII. POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The Korean peninsula has rightly been termed the
"flashpoint" of Asia. The United States and the major
communist powers have been in a continuing toe-to-toe con-
frontation over this small nation's fate for the last
thirty-five years. So far, this paper has tried to analyze
the situation on the peninsula and has tried to highlight
the U.S. interests. It is now time to see how those inter-
ests might be best served in the future and to examine the
various policy options the United States can take.
1. (Talk to the North). I will discuss the most
controversial of these options first, namely, that the
United States and North Korea meet independently, if
necessary
,
to discuss possible courses of actions that
would benefit the interests of all nations involved on the
peninsula. North Korea has, in the past, suggested such
talks, but certain elements within the United States suggest
that negotiations would give the North a propaganda tool,
which they would use to improve their claim to sole legiti-
macy on the peninsula. Also, critics say that this would
add a new divisive element to the already strained U.S.-
R.O.K. relations.
A rebuttal of the critics would have to include a
reminder that sometimes solutions that are thought to be
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unsolvable problems , sometimes involve great risk. Who
would have thought that a mere ten years would have brought
about the abrogation of our Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan and the granting of "most favored Nation" status to
the People's Republic of China.
The United States has contributed to the Korean stale-
mate by maintaining an unchanging Northeast Asia policy for
the past twenty-five years. Exploring new channels might
cause controversy, but it also might bring to light some
solutions. The leadership of North Korea has to know that
its prospects for a solution on their terms, whether this
be a military solution or a negotiated solution, are de-
clining rapidly because of the economic and technological
advances in the South. Therefore, the sooner we can get
them to the negotiating table, the better off both nations
will be. It would be unfortunate that because of our in-
tractability. North Korea and the aging Kim Il-sung felt
that they only had one "last" chance to unify the peninsula
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and attacked the South.
Currently, the United States forces are the only foreign
forces located on the peninsula. The last communist forces
withdrew from the North in 1958. We are dealing from a
position of strength and if we do have visions of withdraw-
ing our combat forces, why not obtain something from the
9-,
Gareth Porter, "Time to talk with the North," Foreign
Policy
,




North in exchange for our withdrawal? What could this some-
thing be? There are a wide range of possibilities that could
lead to reduction of tensions. For example - a mutual reduc-
tion of forces in the North and South with on-site inspec-
tions, a North-South non-aggression treaty, cross recognition,
admission of the two Koreas to the U.N., an agreement between
both parties to negotiate in good faith before the U.S.
Security Council. The main point is that the U.S. will some-
time in the future withdraw our forces from Korea, so why
not receive some real "Currency" from the North in return?
The North is extremely sensitive to the United States'
nuclear capability located in the South and would likely
reciprocate with verifiable reductions in troop strength or
a reduction in the level of arms acquisition and manufacture
in return for their removal.
2. (Disengagement). American ground forces, deployed'
on the Korean peninsula, have played a decisive role in the
maintenance of the security of the Republic of Korea and in
the continued stability of Northeast Asia. The current
administration has proposed to withdraw American combat
troops from the Korean peninsula. The rationale behind such
a withdrawal are many and varied, with the most obvious
being the increasing capability of the R.O.K. to defend it-
self and the most sublime - the psychological paranoia of




The problems for the United States, if it implemented
the policy, would be a loss of influence vis-a-vis the
Republic of Korea and a loss of the overall operational
control of the R.O.K. military.
With the current political uncertainty in the South, the
price of such action as total withdrawal seems too steep a
price to pay. It is incumbent upon the U.S. to maintain
security and stability on the Korean peninsula while
balancing partial removal of U.S. ground forces with a
phased improvement of the ROK military capability. At the
same time these moves must keep in step with the political
developments of the United States' relationships with China,
Japan and the USSR. Presently, a secure and reliable
relationship with South Korea is conducive to stability and
the reduction of tensions in the area should be the test of
the rate of troop reductions, instead of the political and
domestic benefits the American President would accrue from
the withdrawal program.
3, (Limited Disengagement). This option would entail
the basic considerations as option #2, but would let the
United States slowly continue the withdrawal program, while
still providing security and stability to the Korean
peninsula
A possible scenario for this type of withdrawal program
would be to reduce the 2nd Infantry Division to a one
brigade level, which would still provide a "tripwire".
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because more than 3,000 American ground combat soldiers
would remain positioned in the liiajor invasion corridor.
This brigade, which could be rotated from the 2nd Division's
American based location on a yearly basis, or if that was
too costly, separate battalions could be rotated. This
brigade would still continue the mission of providing
security and support for the Panmunjora Security area, but
would not require the extensive network of facilities or
logistical support which is currently being provided to the
2nd Infantry Division.
A programmed transfer of equipment to offset the two
missing brigades could be established and the remaining unit
could also provide training for the ROK units in the area.
The advantages of such a program would be the perception
of the North and South Koreans of a continued American
presence, with a concomitant increase in capacity of South
Korean forces. The American military could still remain in
command and control of the ROK forces under the guise of
the United Nations Command and this would enable the U.S.
military to continue to exert stabilizing influences on the
ROK leadership.
A brigade sized element would fulfill all the functions
of the current division deployment, but would allow the
United States more flexibility in the deployment of its own
forces. Also, if at some future date the decision was made
to withdraw all U.S. forces, the impact of withdrawing one
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brigade of ground forces would have much less repercussion
than the current phased division withdrawal which has been
temporarily halted. There is a large difference in conno-
tation in having at least the one American combat brigade
stationed on the peninsula, versus the planned withdrawal
of all combat ground forces.
4, (Redefine the Status Quo.) The United States has
derived certain benefits from supporting the static situa-
tion as it now exists on the Korean peninsula. The least
of which is the prevention of another war. The U.S. has
also been able to support an extremely non-communist type
of government, which has in turn provided the ROK a
relatively stable framework, in which to reconstruct and
become one of the highly touted economic "success"
stories of Asia. If war can be prevented from recurring
on the peninsula, the Korean economy has the potential to
become a smaller version of Japan, and like that country,
become an asset to other non-communist countries in Asia.
The current problem for the United States is to decide how
to support Korea's efforts towards obtaining this goal of
national independence, free from the coercian of the North.
The time has come for the United States to take a new look
at the Korean situation, with an eye towards preserving
U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. Our post World War II
involvement in the affairs of the newly emerging Korean




has unfortunately meant a continued involvement in the
area, long after the other nations that were involved
withdraw their forces. It would seem that the diplomatic
changes that have occurred in Northeast Asia would require
a "new" look by the U.S. Leadership concerned with our
Asian interests. There are several alternatives to be
explored, which include those options previously analyzed
in this paper, but also several which were not presented.
One version could call for a continuation of support to
South Korea while attempting to work out a comprehensive
political settlement. However, a political settlement
would require the endorsement and support of the D.P.R.K.,
which is not likely to happen as long as Kim Il-sung re-
mains in power with his continued call for reunification,
and only on the North's terms.
The United States is also to blame for the continuing
tension on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. has acted as
the guarantor of South Korea's security for the last
twenty-seven years, and the situation has not changed, nor
is there any indication that it will in the future. The
tensions between the two Korean nations remain at the same
97level as it did when the war ended in 1953. The futility
of continuing such a policy which does not reduce
^''Nathan N. White, U.S. Policy Toward Korea , (Westview
Press; Boulder, Colo.) 1979, pp. 87-94.
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the future risk of involvement, not to mention the costs,
is foolish and it should be the current task of the
United States to redefine our policies and obligations
in relation to South Korea.
The Koreans, both North and South, continue to build
their armed forces, but the North's rapid and determined
build-up borders on the irrational because it has substan-
tially damaged her civilian economic sector and was the
basic cause for her international defaults in 1975. The
North is again trying to renegotiate her Japanese loans
and at the same time still owes the Soviet Union an out-
standing debt of approximately 700 million dollars. This
continued build-up of war material and weaponry seems to
indicate that the North's tensions go well beyond a
"defensive" posture and the continual discovery of
"invasion" tunnels and armed clashes with infiltrators
show that the North feels that it derives some kind of
benefit from provocative actions.
It also appears that the South lacks self confidence in
their ability to survive a renewed conflict, despite their
phenomenal economic growth and the people's firm anti-
communist commitment. This perception probably results
from the large disparities in the military balance, which
is offset by the deterrence role of the U.S. forces based
in the invasion corridors above Seoul. This would indicate
that the ROK has an obligation to work harder and conduct
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themselves rationally so they can hasten the day they can





Since the end of World War II, the United States has
played a decisive role in shaping the course of events in
Korea. This U.S. involvement has stemmed from a series of
U.S. policy decisions, which proved to be critical for
Korea, They are:
(1) The 1945 decision to share the military takeover
of the Korean nation with the Soviet Union. This resulted
in the eventual* division of the Korean nation.
C2) The decision to support a non-communist form of
government in South Korea. The ultimate result of this
decision was the creation of a new state known as the
"Republic of Korea". This was also the beginning of our
major interest on the peninsula, which was to perpetuate and
support this new nation and its anti -communist government.
(3) The U.S. policy decision in 1950, to exclude Korea
and Taiwan from our Asian defense perimeter.
(4) The decision to come to the aid of South Korea,
whose very existence was being threatened by the North
Korean armed forces. Our participation in the Korean war
prevented the formation of a Unified Communist Korea.
(5) The establishment of a iMutual Defense Treaty with
the Republic of Korea in 1953. This demonstrated a con-
tinuing commitment to support the newly established South
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Korean nation against communist aggressors. Subsequent to
this agreement the United States extended large amounts of
military and economic aid to the ROK, which implied a con-
cern for that nation's military and economic well-being.
(6) The decision to withdraw U.S. forces and to reduce
the amount of economic and military assistance provided.
This process started in the late 1960s, when U.S. economic
aid was closed off and again in 1970, when the Seventh
Infantry Division was withdrawn to the United States. This
process is slowly continuing, but the ROK is attempting to
delay the removal of the military for as long as possible.
Other developments, which appear to be a direct result of
this withdrawal process were the crude attempts by the ROK
to try to acquire influence within the U.S. Congress and
the increase in capabilities of the ROK Army by purchasing
advanced weapon systems from the U.S'. and other nations.
There can be no argument that the United States has been
and will continue to be deeply involved in the affairs of
South Korea. All of our policy considerations derive from
this one consideration.
Political stability is the current goal of both the ~
United States and the government of South Korea. Until that
goal is achieved, any progress in reduction of tension on




new military leadership in the South must recognize the
demands of the populace for greater participation in
government and a revised "democratic" constitution, even
at the cost of anti-government demonstrations . The continued
repression of fundamental "rights" can only intensify the
unrest in the South and encourage the leadership in the North
to continue with their bellicose actions.
The United States should also search for new avenues of
negotiation to help ease the long standing confrontation.
This could include the direct approach to the North Koreans
or a conference with the Chinese or the Russians to try and
resolve the Korean crisis. The Chinese and the Russians
both have limited influence over the North, but these
avenues should be tested and exploited by our current
leadership
.
The Koreans have an ancient adage which they continually
quote when dealing in foreign affairs with the great powers.
It superbly illustrates that the United States and other
powers involved in Northeast Asia can influence and guide
the course of action in regards to the Korean peninsula:





Appendix #1 - Cairo Agreement
December 1, 1943
CAIRO DECLARATION (U.S.A., U.K., CHINA)
The several military missions have agreed upon future
military operations against Japan, The Three Great Allies
expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against
their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is
already rising.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the
islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied
since the beginning of the first World War in 1914 and that
all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such
as Manchuria^ Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored
to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from
all other territories which she has taken by violence and
greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in
due course Korea shall become free and independent.
Wiht these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony
with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will
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continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged opera-
tions necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of
Japan,
Signed: Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston Churchill
Chiang Kai-Shek
From: Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, p. 393
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Appendix #2 - Extract from the Moscow Agreement
December 27, 1945
EXTRACT FROM MOSCOW DECLARATION ON KOREA
(U.S.A. , U.K. , U.S.S.R.)
Ill . Korea
1. V/ith a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an
independent state, the creation of conditions for developing
the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible
liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted
Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a pro-
visional Korean democratic government which shall take all
the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport
and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the
Korean people,
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional
Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elabora-
tion of the appropriate measures, there shall be established
a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the
United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet
command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the
Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties
and social organizations. The recommendations worked out
by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration
of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist
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Republics, China and the United Kingdom and the United
States prior to final decision by the two Governments
represented on the Joint Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with
the participation of the provisional Korean democratic
government and of the Korean democratic organizations to
work out measures also for helping and assisting (trustee-
ship) the political, economic and social progress of the
Korean people, the development of democratic self-government
and the establishment of the national independence of
Korea.
The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be
submitted, following consultation with the provisional
Korean Government for the joint consideration of the
Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of
an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea
for a period of up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting
both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration
of measures establishing permanent coordination in adminis-
trative-economic matters between the United States command
in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea,
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a conference of the representatives of the United States
and Soviet Commands in Korea shall be convened within a






Bulletin of the Department
of State, iUo. 2933) , October 1947, pp. 18-19
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Appendix #3 - Truman Doctrine
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE
HARRY 3 . TRUMAN
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world
today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of
the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security
of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to
present to you at this time for your consideration and
decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government
an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance.
Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now
in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece
corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that
assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free
nation.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threaten-
ed by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men,
led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a
number of points, particularly along the northern
boundaries , . ,
.
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with
the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped.
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It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the
authority of the Government throughout Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-
supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States
must supply that assistance. We have already extended to
Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these
are inadequate. There is no other country to which demo-
cratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able
to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek
Government
,
The British Government, which has been helping Greece,
can give no further financial or economic aid after March
31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of
reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of
the world, including Greece.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of
the United States is the creation of conditions in which we
and other nations will be able to work out a way of life
free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war
with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries
which sought to impose their will, and their way of life,
upon other nations.
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from
coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in
establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is
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designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence
for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives,
however, unless we are willing to help free people to main-
tain their free institutions and their national integrity
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recog-
nition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples,
by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations
of international peace and hence the security of the United
States.
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have
recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against
their will. The Government of the United States has made
frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in
violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and
Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other
countries there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The
choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority,
and is distinguished by free institutions, representative
government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty,




The second way of life is based upon the will of a
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies
upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio,
fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freed®ms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free people to work out
their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic
stability and orderly political processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not
sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such
methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political
infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to
maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving
effect to the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations
.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that
the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave
importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall
under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its
neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion




Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent
state would have a profound effect upon those countries in
Europe whose peoples are struggling against great diffi-
culties to maintain their freedoms and their independence
while they repair the damages of war.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries,
which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds,
should lose the victory for which they sacrificed so much.
Collapse of free insititutions and loss of independence
would be disastrous not only for them but for the world.
Discouragement and possible failure would quickly be the
lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their
freedom and independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful
hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well
as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action
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Appendix #4 - Secretary of State Acheson's Speech
to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950
CRISIS IN ASIA - AN EXAMINATION OF U.S. POLICY
An Extract of Remarks by Secretary Acheson
Foundations of Policy
This afternoon I should like to discuss with you the
relations between the peoples of the United States and the
peoples of Asia, and I used the words "relations of the
peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia"
advisedly. I am not talking about governments or nations
because it seems to me what I want to discuss with you is
this feeling of mine that the relations depend upon the
attitudes of the people; that there are fundamental atti-
tudes, fundamental interests, fundamental purposes of the
people of the United States, 150 million of them, and of the
peoples of Asia, unnumbered millions, which determine and
out of which grow the relations of our countries and the
policies of our governments. Out of these attitudes and
interests and purposes grow what we do from day to day.
Now, let's dispose of one idea right at the start and
not bother with it any more. That is the policies of the
United States are determined out of abstract principles in
the Department of State or in the White House or in the
Congress. That is not the case. If these policies are
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going to be good, they must grow out of the fundamental
attitudes of our people on both sides. If they are to be
effective, they must become articulate through all the
institutions of our national life, of which this is one of
the greatest -- through the press, through the radio, through
the churches, through the labor unions, through the business
organizations, through all the groupings of our national life,
there must become articulate the attitudes of our people and
the policies which we propose to follow. It seems to me that
understanding is the beginning of wisdom and therefore, we
shall begin by trying to understand before we announce what
we are going to do, and that is a proposition so heretical
in this town that I advance it with some hesitation.
Now, let's consider some of the basic factors which go
into the making of the attitudes of the peoples on both
sides. I am frequently asked: Has the State Department got
an Asian policy? And it seems to me that that discloses
such a depth of ignorance that it is very hard to begin to
deal with it. The peoples of Asia are so incredibly diverse
and their problems are so incredibly diverse that how could
anyone, even the most utter charlaton believe that he had a
uniform policy which would deal with all of them. On the
other hand, there are very important similarities in ideas
and in problems among the peoples of Asia and so what we
come to, after we understand these diversities and these
common attitudes of mind, is the fact that there must be
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certain similarities of approach, and there must be very
great dissimilarities in action.
Emerging Independence
Let's come now to the matters which Asia has in common.
There is in this vast area what we might call a developing
Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern, and this, I
think, is based upon two factors which are pretty nearly
common to the entire experience of all these Asian people.
One of these factors is a revulsion against the accept-
ance of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life.
Throughout all of this vast area, you have that fundamental
revolutionary aspect in mind and belief. The other common
aspect that they have is the revulsion against foreign
domination. V/hether that foreign domination takes the form
of colonialism or whether it takes the form of imperialism,
they are through with it. They have had enough of it, and
they want no more.
These two basic ideas which are held so broadly and
commonly in Asia tend to fuse in the minds of many Asian
peoples and many of them tend to believe that if you could
get rid of foreign domination, if you could gain indepen-
dence, then the relief from poverty and misery would follow
almost in course. It is easy to point out that that is not
true, and of course, they are discovering that it is not
true. But underneath that belief, there was a very profound
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understanding of a basic truth and it is the basic truth
which underlies all our democratic belief and all our
democratic concept. That truth is that just as no man and
no government is wise enough or disinterested enough to
direct the thinking and the action of another individual,
so no nation and no people are wise enough and disinterested
enough very long to assume the responsibility for another
people or to control another people's opportunities.
That great truth they have sensed, and on that great
truth they are acting. They say and they believe that from
now on they are on their own. They will make their own
decisions. They will attempt to better their own lot, and
on occasion they will make their own mistakes. But it will
be their mistakes, and they are not going to have their
mistakes dictated to them by anybody else.
The symbol of these concepts has become nationalism.
National independence has become the symbol both of freedom
from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny of
poverty and misery.
The Factor of Communism
Now, I stress this, which you may think is a platitude,
because of a very important fact: I hear almost every day
someone say that the real interest of the United States is
to stop the spread of communism. Nothing seems to me to
put the cart before the horse more completely than that. Of
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course we are interested for a far deeper reason than any
conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.
We are interested in stopping the spread of communism
because communism is a doctrine that we don't happen to
like. Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet
foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it is really
the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it
could, take from these people what they have won, what we
want them to keep and develop, which is their own national
independence, their own individual independence, their own
development of their own resources for their own good and
not as mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union.
Military Security in the Pacific
Now, let's in the light of that consider some of these
policies. First of all, let's deal with the question of
military security. I deal with it first because it is im-
portant and because, having stated our policy in that re-
gard, we must clearly understand that the military menace
is not the most immediate.
What is the situation in regard to the military security
of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?
In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of
Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of
assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is
required, both in the interest of our security and in the
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interests of the security of the entire Pacific area and,
in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We
have American - and there are Australian - troops in Japan.
I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I
can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of
abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that what
ever arrangements are to be made either through permanent
settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be
maintained.
This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to
Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important
defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will
continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the
Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to
hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations.
But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of
the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the
Philippine Islands . Our relations, our defensive relations
with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us
Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be
loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter
experience the vital connections between our mutual defense
requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is
hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines
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could not and would not be tolerated by the United States.
But I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of
any such attack.
So far as the military security of other areas in the
Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can
guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must
also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or
necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to say
where such an armed attack could come from - the initial
reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and
then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world
under the Charter of the United Nations which so far has
not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are
determined to protect their independence against outside
aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering
Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with
military considerations. Important as they are, there are
Other problems that press, and these other problems are not
capable of solution through military means. These other
problems arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and
many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and pene-
tration. That cannot be stopped by military means.
Limitations of U.S. Assistance
That leads me to the other thing that I wanted to point
out, and that is the limitation of effective American
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assistance. American assistance can be effective when it
is the missing component in a situation which might other-
wise be solved. The United States cannot furnish all these
components to solve the question. It cannot furnish
determination, it cannot furnish the will, and it cannot
furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if
the will and if the determination exists and if the people
are behind their government, then, and not always then, is
there a very good chance. In that situation, American help
can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment which
could not otherwise be achieved.
(Korea) --In Korea, we have taken great steps which have
ended our military occupation, and in cooperation with the
United Nations, have established an independent and sover-
eign country recognized by nearly all the rest of the
world. We have given that nation great help in getting
itself established. V/e are asking the Congress to continue
that help until it is firmly established, and that legisla-
tion is now pending before the Congress. The idea that we
should scrap all of that, that we should stop half way
through the achievement of the establishment of this
country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and
utter madness in our interests in Asia, But there our
responsibilities are more direct and our opportunities more
clear. When you move to the south, you find that our
opportunity is much slighter and that our responsiblities ,
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except in. the Philippines and there indirectly, are very
small. Those problems are very confusing.
The New Day for Asia
So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is
that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a
day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know
it, and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in
which the old relationships between east and west are gone,
relationships which at their worst were exploitation, and
which at their best were paternalism. That relationship is
over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in
the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness.
V/e are their friends. Others are their friends. We and
those others are willing to help, but we can help only where
we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are
really sensible and possible. So what we can see is that
this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go
on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle
out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia
and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a
decision which a friend or even an enemy from the outside
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A quick and dirty analysis using Nuechterlein's National -Interest
matrix reveals that the U.S. has the least interests of all the nations
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